**template for Peer Review comments**

**Technical series on synthetic biology**

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| **Comments on the Technical Series on Synthetic Biology** |
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| 108 | 44 | into force in 1975 and currently has 168 Parties (**Delete and substitute by 183**)Today, the Convention has 183 States Parties – most of the world’s countriesAs of 1 March 2021. See United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Treaties Database, <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc>. andJ. Revill, J. Borrie, R. Lennane and E. Saunders, 2021. “Preparing for Success at the Ninth Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference: A Guide to the Issues”, UNIDIR, Geneva.<https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/21/BWC/01>. |
| 110 | 37/38/39/40 | Due to the Pandemic situation there is a new schedule:**1st Preparatory Committee (PrepCom)** for the Ninth Review Conference of the Convention is scheduled for November 26, 2021<https://indico.un.org/event/35464/>2nd **Preparatory Committee (PrepCom)** for the Ninth Review Conference of the Convention is scheduled for 4-8 April 2022.The Ninth Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) was originally scheduled for late 2021 and will take place in Geneva from 8-26 August 2022 at Palais des Nations <https://indico.un.org/event/29589/> |
| 121 | 32 | …..leading to biosafety **and biosecurity** (addition)There are many biosecurity concerns (The issue of security) and some vulnerabilities that synthetic biology addsto them, misuse does not always require pathogen access (and biosecurity regulatory system is largely built on access control).On the Issue of safety (Biosafety Concerns) Contagious pathogen could spread beyond laboratory unintentionally as an accident, spread beyond borders and provoke an international incidentThat’s why the need of “a biosafety/biosecurity risk assessment as a systematic process of gathering and evaluating information to identify hazards, determine the associated risks and develop appropriate risk control strategiesFor more specific information on how to conduct a risk assessment, please refer to section 2 risk assessment. Templates and additional guidance can also be found in *Monograph: risk assessment* and *Monograph: biosafety programme management*.”(Laboratory biosafety manual, fourth edition and associated monographs)ISBN 978-92-4-001131-1 (electronic version)ISBN 978-92-4-001132-8 (print version)WHO, 2020. |
| 121 | 35 | …and plant health as well as the environment.  **This is an integrating approach “One Health” where several international, regional and national organizations are involve For Instance (WHO, FAO, OIE and CDC) in a human-animal-ecosystem interface.**[**http://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/one-health**](http://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/one-health)[**http://www.cdc.gov/onehealth/who-we-are/one-health-office-fact-sheet.html**](http://www.cdc.gov/onehealth/who-we-are/one-health-office-fact-sheet.html) |
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|  |  | Additional rows can be added to this table by selecting “Table” followed by “insert” and “rows below” |
| Please submit your comments to secretariat@cbd.int. |