Topic 1: Capacity-building priority needs and challenges

Biosafety protocols are fundamentally designed to mitigate both intentional and unintentional biological risks that could have disastrous effects on a nation’s health system, agriculture, security, political, and economic stability. This broad scope underscores the profound interconnectedness of biosafety with national development and overall human well-being. The field of biosafety in Africa is increasingly challenged by the rapid advancement and potential applications of modern biotechnology, specifically Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), genome editing, and gene drive technologies. While these technologies offer significant potential for addressing critical issues in agriculture and health, they simultaneously introduce novel risks that necessitate robust regulatory oversight.  

Many African countries are currently grappling with the development or updating of their regulatory frameworks to adequately address these dynamic technologies, with numerous frameworks still under discussion or proving insufficient. For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo notably lacks a specific biosafety law for these advanced biotechnologies. This prevailing regulatory uncertainty creates a complex and often precarious environment for biosafety management across the continent. The fast-paced nature of synthetic biology and gene editing technologies consistently outpaces established biosafety and biosecurity measures. This is not merely a static absence of regulation but a dynamic regulatory lag, meaning that as frameworks are developed, the technology continues its rapid evolution, creating a persistent challenge. The uncertainty in regulatory status, as observed in various African nations , implies not only a lack of clarity but also a potential for uncontrolled or inadequately assessed releases of biological agents, thereby increasing systemic biological risk across the continent. This dynamic suggests that current regulatory approaches, often reactive in nature, may be inherently insufficient for the pace of biotechnological innovation.

Significant obstacles impede the alignment of biosafety regulatory frameworks for genome editing and gene drive technology at regional and international levels across African countries. Foremost among these challenges are the prevailing lack of coordination and insufficient information sharing between national regulatory authorities. Additionally, variations in regulatory frameworks and definitions among different countries, coupled with differing concerns about technology transfer and intellectual property rights, pose considerable hurdles.  

Unharmonized regulatory frameworks carry the potential to hinder the application of genome editing and gene drive technologies and impede future international trade, thereby creating significant barriers to continental progress. The lack of harmonization and coordination  is not merely an administrative inefficiency; it functions as a biosafety risk multiplier. In a continent characterized by porous borders and interconnected ecosystems, uncoordinated regulations mean that a biological agent or LMO approved in one country might not be adequately regulated or monitored in a neighboring one. This creates pathways for unintended transboundary movement and potential adverse effects that cannot be effectively monitored or contained. This fragmentation undermines the collective biosafety capacity of the entire region, rendering it vulnerable to risks that transcend national boundaries. Regional harmonization, therefore, emerges as a critical biosafety imperative, rather than simply a policy aspiration.

1. Specific Capacity Building Needs for IPLCs in Biosafety

Addressing the complex biosafety landscape in Africa, particularly in the context of emerging biotechnologies, necessitates targeted capacity building for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs). Their unique position as environmental stewards and holders of invaluable traditional knowledge makes their empowerment critical.

1.1 Enhancing Scientific and Technical Literacy

There is an urgent need for comprehensive training programs and workshops for regulators and stakeholders in Africa to equip them with the practical experience and knowledge necessary for informed decision-making and effective regulatory oversight. This includes a thorough understanding of the nuances of genome editing and gene drive technologies, which are increasingly gaining traction across Africa. A specific focus is required on risk assessment procedures for Living Modified Organisms (LMOs), including GMOs and synthetic biology products, given the current limited experience and prevailing uncertainties in this area.  

Furthermore, accessible information dissemination is crucial, as the fragmented availability of information currently impedes informed decision-making. This implies a need for clear, understandable, and culturally appropriate communication channels. Crucially, this scientific literacy must bridge modern biosafety principles with existing Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK). While the emphasis is often on "building capacity and providing training"  and addressing "fragmented information availability" , a deeper understanding points to the critical importance of how this knowledge transfer occurs. The concept of "co-developing context-specific policies"  and integrating "Indigenous and local knowledge"  suggests that simply transmitting scientific information to IPLCs is insufficient. True capacity building requires a fundamental shift from a one-way transfer to a two-way process of knowledge co-production, where scientific experts learn from TEK, and IPLCs gain scientific literacy in a way that is directly relevant to their lived experiences and cultural contexts. This approach fosters genuine understanding and ownership, moving beyond passive reception to active engagement and adaptation, ensuring that new knowledge is integrated into existing frameworks of understanding.  

1.2 Strengthening Participation in Governance and Decision-Making

IPLCs are often underrepresented and disproportionately affected by environmental and development decisions, despite being essential allies in addressing these issues. Strengthening their voice, choice, and action in land and water decisions is paramount for effective biosafety governance. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety explicitly promotes public awareness and participation in biosafety decision-making. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms for IPLCs needs significant enhancement to ensure their meaningful engagement.  

The Africa CDC's strategic plan emphasizes the establishment of multi-sectoral National Biosafety and Biosecurity Technical Working Groups (NBB-TWGs) that should include civil society. This provides a potential avenue for IPLC representation, though explicit and guaranteed inclusion is critical. Evidence from successful conservation initiatives demonstrates that when IPLCs have substantial influence over decision-making, the outcomes for both human well-being and conservation are overwhelmingly positive. While "public participation"  and the inclusion of "civil society" in NBB-TWGs  are mentioned, the broader context reveals that African research voices often lack "real decision-making power" and face "tokenism" in global preparedness discussions. This implies that current mechanisms for participation are often superficial. For IPLCs, true capacity building in governance means moving beyond mere consultation to empowered governance, where they have legitimate platforms, legal recognition, and the institutional capacity to shape biosafety policies and decisions that directly affect their territories and livelihoods. This requires structural shifts that grant them agenda-setting roles and the ability to hold external actors accountable, ensuring their contributions are not just heard but acted upon.  

1.3 Mobilizing Resources and Infrastructure Support

Many African countries are characterized as low-resource nations, which significantly limits their ability to establish or expand sustainable biosafety capacity. This constraint extends acutely to IPLCs, who often lack the institutional framework necessary to sustainably manage and market natural resources within their territories. Limited access to laboratories, essential equipment, and reagents remains a significant impediment to biosafety research and development across the continent.  

Sustainable capacity building strategies necessitate concerted efforts from a broad spectrum of actors, including African CDC, international development partners, and local governments, to collectively develop, finance, and implement effective solutions. Global initiatives, such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF), already support IPLCs in building capacity related to genetic resources and traditional knowledge, thereby strengthening their institutions, skills, and knowledge development. Organizations like The Nature Conservancy (TNC) actively support local NGOs and communities by providing science, tools, technical skills, new models, and resources to implement community-led solutions. This support includes fostering strong governance structures and resilient natural resource management systems. While external funding and development partners are clearly crucial , a critical underlying challenge is the sustainability and direct control of this funding. The observation that "short-term project grants" are "vulnerable to political and economic shifts"  highlights a significant weakness in current funding models. For IPLCs, biosafety capacity building requires not just access to resources, but mechanisms for direct, sustained, and flexible funding that empowers them to manage their own initiatives, rather than being perpetually dependent on external, often conditional, project cycles. This includes supporting income-generation opportunities that reinforce conservation and cultural values, thereby fostering the economic resilience essential for underpinning long-term biosafety efforts.  

1.4 Integrating Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK)

Traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) held by indigenous communities constitutes a valuable source of ecological information, reflecting centuries of meticulous observation, direct experience, and practical experimentation concerning the interaction of plants, animals, and people within their ecosystems. Integrating indigenous and local knowledge in conservation and natural resource management (NRM) initiatives is indispensable for achieving sustainability, equity, and responsiveness to local realities and needs. This integration is also a crucial prerequisite for decolonizing the research process, ensuring that diverse knowledge systems are equally valued.  

Despite its profound importance, TEK is currently threatened by changing cultural mores, the influence of formal education, and the pervasive forces of modernization. Furthermore, significant challenges exist in adequately documenting, valuing, and addressing power relations during knowledge integration processes. The relevance of knowledge integration is threefold: it helps maintain biocultural diversity, fills critical gaps in scientific know-how, and fundamentally recognizes IPLK as essential for social justice, sovereignty, autonomy, and the identity of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities. The snippets acknowledge TEK as a "valuable source of ecological information"  and emphasize the need for "integrating Indigenous and local knowledge". However, a more profound understanding reveals that TEK is not merely a static dataset to be extracted and integrated into Western scientific frameworks. It is a living, dynamic biosafety system intrinsically embedded in cultural practices, beliefs, and local governance structures. The decline of TEK due to external pressures  represents a direct loss of inherent biosafety capacity. Therefore, capacity building must focus not just on integrating TEK into formal biosafety frameworks, but on preserving, revitalizing, and empowering the communities that hold this knowledge. This enables them to continue developing and applying their own biosafety practices in a changing world, which necessitates respecting their intellectual property and ensuring equitable benefit-sharing.  

1.5. Developing Community-Based Monitoring and Surveillance Systems

Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities are vital for the early detection and rapid response to biological risks, serving as crucial complements to formal surveillance systems. Community engagement has demonstrably increased trust and facilitated effective reporting of health events, as evidenced by the success of event-based surveillance (EBS) systems in countries like Liberia.  

EBS systems, which involve authorities monitoring media, hotlines, and directly engaging with impacted communities, provide a critical head start in stopping outbreaks quickly, contrasting with the often reactive nature of traditional indicator-based systems. Successful examples include the training of forest scouts to monitor reserves and the support for community management of wildlife areas, which clearly demonstrate IPLCs' inherent capacity for on-the-ground monitoring and enforcement. These systems effectively leverage local knowledge and existing community networks, ensuring that early warning signs do not go unnoticed, particularly in rural and hard-to-reach areas where formal infrastructure may be limited. The success of "event-based surveillance" and community engagement initiatives  highlights that biosafety is not solely a top-down regulatory function but also a robust bottom-up resilience mechanism. IPLCs, through their intimate connection with their environment and strong community networks, are uniquely positioned to act as the "eyes and ears" on the ground for the early detection of unusual biological events, such as disease outbreaks or unexpected changes in plant life. Building their capacity in monitoring transforms them from passive recipients of biosafety measures into active, proactive agents. This decentralized approach significantly enhances overall biosafety resilience, especially in contexts where formal state capacity is limited or slow to react, providing a crucial layer of protection.

I am Martha Kalumbi from Malawi.
on topic 1. my comment is ia as follows: In my view, having knowledge of what to do or how to address violations of existing biosafety measures is not always enough—especially when financial constraints hinder one’s ability to hold violators accountable. Therefore, I believe that strengthening administrative systems to effectively generate resources for the implementation and enforcement of regulatory frameworks is essential.

Dear participants,

My Name is Thato Mogapi from South Africa and I am the Moderator for this Online Forum. I am the National Focal Point for the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, based at the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment.

It is great to see that you have started sharing your views and experiences.

Please be reminded to briefly introduce yourself when posting your first message, including your name, title, country, institutional affiliation and current responsibilities.

Please also keep your messages short, concise and focussed, for the discussion topic.

Kindly refer to the guidelines and modalities for the Forum to ensure that your messages are consistent and relevant for the discussion topic. These are available on the Forum page.

Looking forward to more of your contributions.

Kind regards
Ms Thato Mogapi

I appreciate your supports
My name is Ismail Mohammed from Sudan, The Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources, Biosafety Department, BCH national focal point.
Regarding to this topic in my opinion it is better to give the priority needs for strengthening the administrative system, training regulators and conducting risk assessment of LMOs.
Thanks

Thanks Ms. Thato for your invaluable support. My name is Daniel Mabengo Ngimbi, I am an IPLC representative from DRC, I am affiliated to ANAPAC-DRC, IIN-KENYA and IIFB, I am currently serving as a Member of the Steering Committee of the CALI FUND. I would like to apologize for making my contributions a bit longer in my early posts.

Thank you very much, dear Ms. Thato Mogapi, for moderating this important discussion.
My name is Ediner Fuentes-Campos. I am Deputy Director of Research and Development at the Secretariat of Science, Technology and Innovation of Panama and serve as the National Focal Point for Panama under the Cartagena Protocol.

For Panama, in addition to what has been mentioned regarding strengthening the capacities of national specialists in environmental risk assessment for GMOs, we also consider it pertinent to advance in creating collaborative spaces between more developed and less developed parties in biotechnology regulation under the Protocol framework. It is essential to strengthen relationships and information exchange between biosafety entities and commissions, as well as to generate dialogue spaces between regulatory agencies and institutions from countries with different levels of regulatory development. Here in North America, Central America, the Caribbean, and South America, these collaboration opportunities have been promoted for more than 20 years by the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture, supporting us in staying informed about developments within the framework of the Convention and its protocols. However, there remains a need to build communication capacities among all parties to the Protocol.

I also consider it important that the capacities we should aim for must include technical assistance to countries to advance the review of local regulations and achieve progress in harmonizing international standards toward evidence-based regulations grounded in sufficient scientific research. It is fundamental to begin identifying and documenting good regulatory practices that enable less advanced countries to access more agile processes without compromising scientific rigor. We must begin promoting the compilation of information on GMO events that have been approved for more than 20 years and have not reported any adverse events to date. We must strengthen capacities to promote the history of safe use as an essential component in risk assessment processes. This is where knowledge is necessary to advance simplified but scientifically-based procedures that allow us to recognize these elements in national evaluation processes.

Building on the experiences shared by colleagues from Mexico, Kenya, Malawi, and Sudan, Panama recognizes that capacity building needs extend beyond technical training to include strengthening administrative systems and generating resources for effective implementation and enforcement of regulatory frameworks. We particularly align with the need for enhanced coordination and information sharing between national regulatory authorities, as highlighted by our African colleagues.

The Inter-American experience demonstrates that sustained regional cooperation can significantly enhance national capacities. However, we must move beyond information sharing toward developing practical tools and simplified, science-based procedures that can facilitate more efficient risk assessments while maintaining rigorous safety standards. The identification and transfer of good regulatory practices can significantly accelerate capacity development in countries with less developed regulatory frameworks, enabling them to implement more agile processes based on the accumulated experience of countries with greater expertise. This includes leveraging the substantial body of evidence from two decades of safe GMO use to inform more streamlined evaluation processes, particularly for well-characterized events with established safety profiles.

Dear colleagues

We are about midway into the discussions.

Thank you very much for your contributions thus far, particularly the views expressed on some of the challenges and the points on priority needs for capacity-building.

Please feel free to comment on each other’s posts.

I would like to encourage participants who have not yet posted to share their views and experiences.

Kind regards
Ms Thato Mogapi

Esteemed colleagues,

I am Gabriel Mutis from the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development of Colombia. In contribution to the discussion, I consider that the priority capacity-building needs should focus on strengthening and articulating the existing administrative systems necessary for the effective implementation of biosafety regulatory frameworks, as well as developing a comprehensive national biosafety strategy program, which would help coordinate institutional efforts, allocate resources more efficiently, and ensure compliance with the objectives set out in the Capacity-building Action Plan under the Cartagena Protocol.

Additionally, as emphasized in the summary of submissions, it is crucial to integrate emerging areas such as synthetic biology into national biosafety agendas. Particular attention should be given to the development of technical capacities for conducting safety risk assessments related to genome editing technologies. This includes updating regulatory tools, training evaluators and researchers, and fostering collaboration between scientific institutions and competent authorities.

Dear Colleagues,

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this forum.

My name is Naweed Mohamed from Biosafety South Africa – Technology Innovation Agency, where I work with biosafety awareness, stakeholder engagement, and capacity development projects, especially around emerging biotechnologies.

Effective implementation of the Capacity-building Action Plan requires more than technical support — it demands innovative, inclusive, and sustainable strategies. Strengthening national systems, training risk assessors, improving LMO monitoring, and ensuring long-term funding are all essential.

Digital transformation is equally important. The BCH is vital, but national platforms and networks need upgrades. Tools like AI-assisted data interpretation, multilingual dashboards, and interactive communication systems can boost transparency and engagement.

Training must evolve too. We need hybrid learning, mentorship, and simulation-based models to embed capacity sustainably. Often, delays in information-sharing stems not from lack of intent, but from limited infrastructure and data translation capacity.

Public participation remains a challenge. At Biosafety South Africa, we’ve seen shifts in a positive direction through using creative science communication—storytelling, social media, and engaging via our national bioeconomy portal—to empower communities as active partners in biosafety.

To build resilient biosafety systems, we must integrate innovation, shift to institutionalized capacity-building, involve public-private partnerships, and embed biosafety into education and governance. In my opinion, when biosafety becomes more relatable, awareness becomes advocacy, and participation drives policy.

I support the points made by colleagues: capacity-building must be context-specific, regionally coordinated, and globally reinforced.

Looking forward to continued learning and collaboration.

Best regards,
Naweed Mohamed
Project Manager – Biosafety South Africa

Je suis M. KAKPO Comlan Marcel, Spécialiste en Protection de L’Environnement et des Ressources Naturelles, Je suis de la République du Bénin. Je suis un ancien Point Focal National du Protocole de Cartagena et du Centre de prévention des risques biotechnologiques, Ancien Suppléant du Point Focal National de la Convention sur la Diversité Biologique, Expert en Biosécurité. Actuellement je suis Consultant Indépendant.

1. Sur la base des informations soumises par les gouvernements et les organisations concernant la mise en œuvre ou le financement d'activités de renforcement des capacités en biosécurité, quels sont, selon vous, les principaux besoins prioritaires et défis pour la mise en œuvre du Plan d’action pour le renforcement des capacités (par exemple, sécuriser un soutien financier pour appliquer les réglementations, partager l’information, renforcer les systèmes administratifs nécessaires à la mise en œuvre des cadres réglementaires, réaliser des évaluations des risques liés aux OVM, former les régulateurs) ?

Mon pays dispose aujourd’hui des instruments législatif et réglementaire : la loi n°2021-01 du 03 février 2021 sur la Biosécurité en République du Bénin et le Décret n°2025-015 du 22 janvier 2025 portant attributions, organisation et fonctionnement du Conseil National de la Biosécurité. Pour faire fonctionner ce Conseil, il faut des ressources humaines bien formés, des équipements et des ressources financières conséquentes et constantes.

Au vu de ce qui précède, les principaux besoins sont :
- Sécuriser un soutien financier pour le fonctionnement du Point Focal National et le Conseil National de Biosécurité ;
- Former les ressources humaines qui vont animer les différentes structures du Conseil sur les thématiques: évaluation et gestion des risques biotechnologiques, Gestion des essais en milieu confiné, réglementation, documentation, contrôle et inspection, information, sensibilisation et participation du public etc.
- Renforcer les capacités des autres acteurs (douane, marines militaire et marchande, vétérinaires, médecins, journalistes, société civile, etc.).
Les défis sont : - La mise en place effective du Conseil National de la Biosécurité ; - Le fonctionnement effectif et régulier de tous les organes du Conseil.


2. D’après les soumissions mentionnées ci-dessus, certains besoins prioritaires et défis liés à la mise en œuvre du Plan d’action pour le renforcement des capacités du Protocole n’ont pas été mis en évidence, notamment :
(f) Objectif A.3 : Informations complètes sur la mise en œuvre du Protocole fournies en temps opportun par les Parties.
(g) Objectif A.4 : Conformité aux exigences du Protocole.
(h) Objectif A.6 : Mouvements transfrontières illégaux et non intentionnels d’OVM.
(i) Objectif A.9 : Considérations socio-économiques relatives aux OVM.
(j) Objectif B.3 : Participation du public concernant les OVM.
Pouvez-vous fournir des informations sur les besoins prioritaires et les défis liés à ces objectifs ?

REPONSES

(f) Objectif A.3 : Informations complètes sur la mise en œuvre du Protocole fournies en temps opportun par les Parties.
Les besoins et les défis sont la formation continue et permanente des contributeurs au niveau des autres structures ministérielles (Agriculture, élevage, pêche, santé, enseignement supérieur, etc.)  pour soumettre les données de manière continue.
(g) Objectif A.4 : Conformité aux exigences du Protocole.
Chaque pays compte tenu de ses contingences politiques et économiques se conforme aux exigences du protocole. Ainsi mon pays pas à pas se conforme aux exigences du protocole. Il faut un appui constant en formation aux points focaux nationaux en matière de lobbing auprès des autorités politiques (Gouvernement et Assemblées nationales).
(h) Objectif A.6 : Mouvements transfrontières illégaux et non intentionnels d’OVM.
Nommer et former la personne habilitée à recevoir les notifications données conformément à l’Article 17.2 et l’Article 25 du Protocole de Cartagena et communiquer ses coordonnées au Centre d’échange.
(i) Objectif A.9 : Considérations socio-économiques relatives aux OVM.
Etant donné qu’aucune décision n’a été prise pour l’importation d’OVM dans mon pays, cet objectif est sans objet. Mais il nécessaire de former les régulateurs sur cette thématique afin de leur permettre d’être opérationnels et d’en tenir compte au moment opportun des évaluations.
(j) Objectif B.3 : Participation du public concernant les OVM.
Il faut élaborer et mettre en œuvre un plan de communication. Pour ce faire il faut un appui financier au Conseil National de la Biosécurité pour lui permettre d’assurer la sensibilisation et la participation du public.

Hello everyone, my name is Farah Aligour. I work at the Ministry of Agriculture in Trinidad and Tobago in the Research Division. Currently I am the National Focal Point for the BCH.

Trinidad and Tobago is a developing country and as such financial support is critical to sustain biosafety initiatives. Competing national priorities mean that biosafety often receives little or no budget allocation. Dedicated funding is necessary not only for policy and regulatory work but also for training, infrastructure, and public awareness. One of the most pressing needs is access to qualified technical consultants who can guide regulators and policymakers through the legislative drafting and implementation process. While information exists, translating it into locally applicable regulations and procedures requires tailored legal and scientific expertise. In addition, there is need to build and operationalize administrative systems that allow for coordination among relevant ministries and agencies. Lack of national coordination limits progress which often results in inaction.

Hello Ismail Mohammed. I completely agree that strengthening administrative systems, training regulators, and building capacity for risk assessment of LMOs are top priorities. In my country, we are also facing similar challenges, particularly the lack of a national legal framework and limited institutional coordination.We all share common ground in recognizing that building these capacities is essential to ensure biosafety is integrated into national development plans and not left behind.

Dear Mr Ngimbi Daniel Mabengo,

Thank you for your valuable insights on the capacity-building challenges and needs for IPLCs, notably, the need for targeted capacity building; making information accessible through clear, understandable, and culturally appropriate communication channels; bridging modern biosafety principles with existing traditional knowledge; having a two-way process for co-production of knowledge; enhancing the effectiveness of public awareness and participation mechanisms under the Protocol for IPLCs for meaningful engagement; and access to resources and mechanisms for direct, sustained, and flexible funding to manage initiatives.

Kind Regards
Ms Thato Mogapi

Name: KAREMERA Vincent
Title: Program Manager
Country: Rwanda
Institutional Affiliation: Association Rwandaise des Ecologistes (ARECO-RWANDA NZIZA)
Current Responsibilities: Leading chemical health-related advocacy, awareness, and community engagement initiatives including pesticide management, lead paint awareness, and clean energy transition projects.

1. Key Capacity-building Priority Needs and Challenges

Based on regional biosafety trends and our organization’s practical field experience:
Operationalizing Regulatory Frameworks: Although legal frameworks exist in many countries, implementing regulations often face bottlenecks due to inadequate funding, lack of trained personnel, and fragmented institutional coordination. Technical and institutional strengthening of biosafety authorities is urgently needed.
Risk assessment and detection of LMOs: A major challenge across the region is the absence or underdevelopment of laboratory infrastructure for LMO detection, which undermines scientifically sound risk assessments. Capacity-building should focus on upgrading labs, training scientists, and facilitating access to shared regional facilities.
Securing sustainable financing: Biosafety activities often rely on short-term donor projects. Countries need support to develop sustainable financing mechanisms, including integrating biosafety into national development and environment budgets.
Public awareness and outreach: Grassroots awareness of biosafety is still very low. Investments in communication strategies, inclusive engagement, and culturally relevant materials are essential to reach smallholder farmers, agro-dealers, and youth.

2. Underrepresented Goals – Needs and Challenges
Goal A.4 – Compliance with Protocol Requirements
Compliance monitoring mechanisms are weak or nonexistent in many jurisdictions. There’s limited capacity to audit, track, and respond to non-compliance.
Priority: Design simple compliance tracking tools, build institutional capacity for compliance audits, and promote cross-sector collaboration (e.g., between agriculture, environment, and customs).
Goal A.6 – Illegal/Unintentional Transboundary Movement
Porous land borders and growing agricultural trade in the region increase the risk of unregulated/undocumented LMO movement. Training customs and quarantine officers and establishing clear inspection protocols are necessary preventive actions.
Priority: Develop and implement border inspection protocols, and provide targeted training and detection equipment to frontline officers.
Goal A.9 – Socio-economic Considerations
Socio-economic impacts of LMOs are rarely analyzed, partly due to a lack of frameworks and local data. There's also minimal involvement of communities in such assessments.
Priority: Support pilot projects and capacity-building for community-based socio-economic assessments, including integrating traditional knowledge into biosafety decisions.
While progress has been made across the region in biosafety legislation and planning, significant gaps remain in implementation, technical infrastructure, stakeholder participation, and compliance monitoring.

Warm regards,
KAREMERA Vincent

My warm thanks to Thato Mogapi for moderating this round of discussions.

My name is Piet van der Meer. I am trained in biology and law, and I have been involved in biosafety regulation since 1986, first in the service of the Government of the Netherlands, and later at the service of developing countries, countries with economies in transition, the public research sector and academia.

My impressions from these years of involvement in biosafety capacity building aligns with many of the topics that have been suggested as priorities for capacity building, e.g. alignment of biosafety regulatory frameworks at regional and international levels (#12706), training for regulators, risk assessors and enforcement services (#12707, #12714, #12719,), strengthening administrative systems (#12708, #12712), creating collaborative spaces between more developed and less developed parties (#12714), developing coherent national biosafety strategy programs (#12718), and training on coordination among relevant ministries and agencies (#12721, #12725).

I'd like to adding something that has not been mentioned explicitly: given that aspects such as risk assessment, risk management, monitoring and enforcement, public participation, national coordination, have their basis in the underlying regulatory framework, I recommend training in ex ante and ex post review of draft regulations along criteria such as justification, clarity, consistency, workability, enforceability and adjustability, as well as ex ante and ex post assessment of impacts in terms of efficacy and efficiency.

Lastly, two general observations.

First, in relation to the concern that there are still quite a few countries that do not have biosafety frameworks in place: while most of those countries do indeed have an obligation since the mid-1990s to establish national biosafety systems, the lack of national regulations does not mean there is ‘nothing’, because precisely for those cases the procedures of the CPB have been established.

Second, I warmly echo that the Inter-American IICA experience demonstrates that sustained regional cooperation can significantly enhance national capacities.

Best regards to all !

Piet van der Meer

Hello Mr. Pieter van der Meer, I am Farah Aligour, BCH focal point from Trinidad and Tobago.

Thank you for these thoughtful points. I truly appreciate the clarification regarding the obligations under the CPB and the role its procedures play, particularly in the absence of national regulations as is the case in my country. It’s an important reminder that while formal frameworks may still be lacking in some countries, there are nonetheless mechanisms in place to guide biosafety actions.

I also fully agree that the IICA experience has shown how valuable sustained regional cooperation can be in strengthening national capacities. I regularly attend the IICA sessions and always find your presentations insightful and engaging. Thank you again for your continued contributions to the regional biosafety dialogue.

Best Regards

I am Aleksej Tarasjev, head of Department for Evolutionary Biology in Institute for Biological Research, Belgrade University, Serbia. I am chair of Serbian Expert Council on Biosafety, Serbian focal point for FAO GM Food Platform, and I worked as an expert on biosafety for various UN agencies (UNEP, FAO, SCBD).

Regarding current challenges to biosafety system in Serbia, there are three issues that have crucial negative impact.

First one is tremendous threat to science in Serbia that alone can abolish any scientifically based national biosafety decision making. Namely, in March 2025 government issued decree that leaves only 5 hours per week for research to professors employed at state universities. If complied with, faculties will cede to be scientific institutions, undercutting any possibility of appropriate national scientific basis for biosafety.

Second one is extreme dysfunctionality of whole legal system in Serbia, which hampers any attempt to implement regulatory and administrative procedures. Clearest example of this in the field of biosafety is that our GMO Law (2009) explicitly obliges relevant ministry to produce specified rulebooks within six months, but after fifteen years we are still waiting for those mandated rulebooks essential for functional biosafety system.

Finally, in order to make scientifically based decisions, government should incorporate opinions of expert bodies, and of particular scientists obtained through public participation. At present, government in Serbia systematically neglect (and often mock) scientifically based opinions in almost any field of expertise. Exemplary case related to impacts on human health and environment is mistreating and neglecting united opinion of all relevant biological institutions regarding destructive impact of proposed lithium mining in Serbia.

I think we should not neglect this “elephant in the room” and use regional “exchange of experiences and lessons learned” part of our capacity building activities to try to somehow mitigate those impacts.

I am Ma. Lorelie U. Agbagala, BCH National Focal Point from the Philippines.

Regarding some key capacity-building priority needs and challenges that were  identified from the submissions, let me make a comment on some of them:

1. Securing sustainable financial support
Many countries, especially developing ones, face serious limitations in accessing dedicated funding to support the full implementation of biosafety regulations. This affects everything from staffing and infrastructure to outreach and enforcement. There is a strong need for long-term, predictable funding mechanisms, both domestic and international.
2. Strengthening institutional and administrative systems
Implementing biosafety frameworks requires functional, well-coordinated administrative structures, including clear procedures, timely decision-making processes, and effective monitoring mechanisms. In many cases, regulatory agencies need technical and operational strengthening to function efficiently.
3. Conducting risk assessment and risk management of LMOs
There is an ongoing need to enhance technical expertise in scientifically sound risk assessment methodologies, especially for new and emerging technologies like gene editing. This includes the ability to access, generate, and interpret relevant data.
4. Training of regulators and inspectors
Continuous training is needed to keep regulators and inspectors updated on new developments in biotechnology, risk assessment approaches, and detection technologies. This also includes improving soft skills such as communication and stakeholder engagement.
5. Enhancing LMO detection and identification capacity
The capacity to detect and verify LMOs, especially at ports of entry, remains uneven across countries. Investing in modern laboratory facilities, training of personnel, and participation in proficiency testing are critical needs.
6. Promoting information-sharing and coordination
National biosafety systems can greatly benefit from regional cooperation and improved access to international biosafety information. Platforms such as the BCH (Biosafety Clearing-House) are underutilized due to lack of awareness or technical capacity.
7. Raising public awareness and stakeholder engagement
Public understanding of biotechnology and biosafety remains limited. Building trust and acceptance through transparent, science-based, and culturally sensitive communication strategies is a continuous challenge.

Addressing these capacity-building needs—especially in regulation, training, and information-sharing—is essential for effective biosafety implementation. The Philippines remains committed to strengthening its systems through collaboration and continued support from partners.

Thank you once again for this opportunity to contribute to the conversation.

I think there are three key priority needs and challenges for implementing the Capacity-building Action Plan include. Firstly, we need establish and strengthen regulatory frameworks and administrative systems, developing, enacting, and operationalizing comprehensive national biosafety laws, regulations, and administrative procedures aligned with international obligations. However, the challenge is lacking of legal mandates, unclear institutional responsibilities, cumbersome approval processes, and insufficient inter-agency coordination hamper implementation. Second, we need build expertise in scientific risk assessment work, training regulators, scientists, reviewers in conducting scientifically sound environmental and food/feed safety risk assessments for GMOs in types of environments. We face challenges on severe shortage of specialized expertise, such as molecular biology, ecology, toxicology workers, lacking of reference labs that result in difficulties in accessing scientific data. Thirdly, we need develop robust monitoring systems, particularly in natural environment, establishing systems for post-release monitoring of approved GMOs, border inspection detection, sampling and testing, and mechanisms for enforcing compliance and addressing illegal transboundary movements. Of course, there are lots of challenges, such as lacking of infrastructures, standardized protocols, trained advisers, financial supports and so on.

I thank Ms. Thato Mogapi for a superb job done in moderating this session.

My name is Charles Mugoya, from Uganda. I work with the Target Malaria Project, hosted locally at the Uganda Virus Research Institute as a Regulatory Affairs Manager - Africa. 

In my opinion, the priority needs and challenges for biosafety capacity building and strengthening specifically include the following:
1. The strengthening of national biosafety regulatory bodies (biosafety and environmental agencies) with clear mandates and operational capabilities. This is a neglected area that has been left out in capacity building activities to date, yet these bodies are gatekeepers to the implementation of biosafety at national level.
2. The building of expertise among competent authorities, to evaluate the technical aspects of laboratory practices and protocols for GMOs being developed in the countries. This activity goes a long way to  complement the detection and monitoring of GMOs in their jurisdiction.
3. The empowerment of regulatory authorities to continuously provide public awareness and communication resources to ensure compliance with international and national biosafety protocols;
4. The training of regulators and developers in the effective adherence to biosafety regulations through effective Quality Management Systems especially in the area of biosafety monitoring and enforcement.
5. The establishment of international guidance documents and standards to facilitate credible data portability evidence for purposes of risk assessment and management.
I feel strongly that,  if these areas are addressed, they will contribute greatly to Goal A.4 on compliance with the requirements of the Protocol.

Greetings to all and thanks to our moderator and all participants for the interesting interventions. My name is Lim Li Ching, and I am a Senior Researcher at the Third World Network, where I coordinate our biodiversity and biosafety work. My responses below are relevant to Questions 1 and 2 (with the exception of Goal A.3, as that is Party-specific).

In our view, the evolving fields of genetic engineering and synthetic biology do raise new biosafety challenges. The following are some key features of the changing nature of genetic technologies, where future capacity-building efforts could be focused, in order to still continue to meet the objectives of the CBD and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and to ensure compliance with the requirements of the Protocol:

1) The increased broadening of applications beyond agriculture, in areas such as conservation and public health, is a challenge to current risk assessment experience and requires building multidisciplinary expertise and capacities. For example, direct interventions into human health applications may present novel risks to disease epidemiology that will require careful public health analysis.

2) There is increased scalability of LMO releases, due to the rise of genome editing, and other tools such as RNAi sprays or CRISPR-based pesticides. Capacities need to be built to assess the risks associated with such large-scale and multiple interventions.

3) Gaps remain in the understanding and assessment of the long-term, evolutionary and ecosystem-wide impacts of new LMOs, for which capacity building efforts are needed.

4) Capacity-building is needed to address risk uncertainties and how the precautionary approach can be operationalised when uncertainty is too high to take a decision on environmental releases. Capacity in the application of complementary methods such as ‘cut-off criteria’ is needed to ensure that precautionary decision-making occurs when a risk assessment cannot be finalized or when there are difficulties in conducting key aspects of a risk assessment.

5) Developers are increasingly turning to the use of modelling tools to address risk and uncertainties. Capacities need to be built for independent modelling expertise, including training in how to address issues of data transparency, reliability (or lack thereof when uncertainty is high), reproducibility or bias.

6) There are unresolved complexities with regard to obtaining the free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) of potentially affected indigenous peoples and local communities. Capacity-building on how to enable meaningful public participation and how to operationalise FPIC is needed, including for applications designed to spread into wild ecosystems, across borders and beyond managed agro-ecosystems.

7) Capacity-building on the assessment of socio-economic impacts, including ethical and cultural dimensions, is increasingly needed as applications broaden in scope, scale and depth of intervention.

8) Legal and regulatory expertise need to continue to be built, including on liability and redress. The increased scale and spread of new LMOs also emphasises the need to build capacity in addressing illegal and unintentional transboundary movements, including in countries that have not authorised their use.

Thank you.

Dear colleagues,

Thank you very much for your contributions.

There are some very interesting views on priorities for capacity-building and some interesting suggestions coming through. These are just some noted from your contributions:
• Strengthening institutional and administrative systems
• Better coordination and information sharing among relevant ministries and agencies
• Securing sustainable financial support
• Training regulators, risk assessors, enforcement officers
• Building capacities for conducting risk assessment (including for emerging areas)
• Building capacities for LMO detection and identification and LMO monitoring
• Strengthening relationships and information exchange
• Capacities for providing technical assistance to other countries
• Regional exchange of experiences and lessons learned
• Documenting good regulatory practices
• Generating dialogue spaces between regulatory agencies and institutions from countries with different levels of regulatory development
• Building communication capacities among all parties to the Protocol
• Harmonizing international standards (alignment of biosafety regulatory frameworks at regional and international levels)
• Developing comprehensive national biosafety strategy programs
• Fostering collaboration between scientific institutions and competent authorities
• Having innovative, inclusive, and sustainable strategies
• Digital transformation through the use of various tools (e.g. AI)
• Hybrid learning, mentorship, and simulation-based models
• Establishing public-private partnerships
• Embedding biosafety into education and governance
• Ensuring access to qualified technical consultants to guide legislative drafting and implementation processes
• Providing training in review of draft regulations and assessing impacts (efficacy and efficiency).

This is in no way an exhaustive list of what has been shared so far, but just to demonstrate the wealth of information that has come through your contributions.

I have also noted the suggestions on priorities for the various goals that did not have information, including the need to build institutional capacity for compliance audits, promoting cross-sector collaboration, training customs and quarantine officers and establishing inspection protocols.

For those who have not yet contributed, there is still time to add your views on priorities for capacity-building and share your experiences,

Kind Regards
Thato

POSTED ON BEHALF OF ANNAH TAKOMBWA, ZIMBABWE

I am Annah Takombwa and I work for the National Biotechnology Authority (NBA) in Zimbabwe. NBA is the National Competent Authority for the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.

The key capacity building priority needs and challenges to implement the capacity building action plan include:

1. Administrative systems need to be strengthened for effective regulation. This entails securing financial resources for tools of trade to enable conducting of regulatory activities.
2. Training regulators on risk assessment and detection of LMOs.
3. Capacitating decision makers e.g., policy makers to enable them to make science-based decisions.
4. Review or drafting of legislation and supporting guidelines.
5. Exchange programmes for regulators to learn from Parties with well established systems.

Many thanks to Ms Thato Mogapi for moderating this forum.
I fully support the previous posts emphasizing the urgent need to strengthen capacity-building for effective biosafety implementation. Capacity building efforts should prioritize securing sustainable financial resources, enhancing training for regulators on risk assessment of LMOs, upgrading administrative and monitoring systems, and improving information-sharing platforms. Strengthening institutional coordination and fostering multi-stakeholder partnerships are equally critical to ensure regulatory frameworks are fully operational and adaptive to evolving biotechnologies. Without these, commitments under the Capacity-building Action Plan cannot translate into meaningful action on the ground.

Dear All,

Blessings to all. Thank you to the moderators and participants for this important discussion. My name is Eva Sirinathsinghji and I am a biosafety researcher with Third World Network. I have been working with civil society for the last 12 years on biosafety aspects of genetic technologies applied to the environment and human health.

As raised in our submission shared in post #12727 (Topic 2) by my colleague Lim Li Lin (and also here: https://bch.cbd.int/en/pdf/documents/submission/BCH-SUB-SCBD-277130/1), LMO applications are broadening in depth of intervention and scope. Applications are going beyond agriculture, and also moving towards the targeting of wild species and populations, including with self-spreading capacity with no mechanism for recall or reversal. This is going beyond current experience in risk assessment that has been largely restricted to annual crop applications.

Some examples of the needs for capacity building in the context of specific novel/emerging technologies are raised below:

1) The self-spreading nature of technologies such as LMOs containing engineered gene drives, as well as other LMOs designed to replicate in the wild, raise a host of biosafety, socio-economic, liability and redress, and consent challenges. While increased information sharing and/or harmonisation of regulatory frameworks are two proposals for addressing the lack of ability to control spread, including across national borders, they may fall short of adequately solving the problems. As stipulated in Annex III, risk assessments require assessing potential impacts on the receiving environment, and indeed, new technologies such as gene drives make local, context-specific information and assessment even more pertinent, given their ability to spread across multiple receiving environments, and the risks and uncertainties involved therein. Information and assessment thus need to be able to address all the potential receiving environments across large spatio-temporal scales, taking into account evolutionary dimensions. One example for engineered gene drives for vector control is the identified risk of niche replacement with secondary disease vectors, the abundance/spectrum of which varies across environments, countries and time, with some vectors increasing or decreasing in dominance in recent years, or establishing themselves in new environments. Such risks have direct implications for human health, potentially undermining or eroding efficacy of the technology.

The self-spreading nature of technologies or applications aimed at wild populations also challenge current phased approaches to environmental releases. A trial release of self-spreading technology, or those designed to replicate in the wild, has the potential to result in full-scale deployment, as noted by both the recent voluntary guidance document on self-sustaining engineered gene drives, as well as by the WHO guidance, which note that it is “difficult to distinguish the specific transition” between small-scale field trials and open releases. Yet this aspect of risk assessment remains unresolved for such applications.

How such technologies are adequately assessed in relation to all potential receiving environments over long-term and evolutionary time scales warrants further capacity building. Such technologies also have direct socio-economic implications posed by potential biosafety and efficacy risks exemplified above.

How free, prior and informed consent can be operationalised where there is no clear path for opt-out, is a capacity building need that remains unmet, and one that may be further exacerbated by regulatory harmonisation.

2) Techniques such as genome editing allow for an increased scale of human intervention into nature and genetic diversity, increasing potential species amendable to engineering, as well as types of traits being generated. For genome editing, capacity is required to address such novel biosafety considerations. To give one small example, using genome editing to knock out genes raises risk assessment challenges for frameworks primarily designed to assess the risk of inserting foreign genes e.g. potential toxicity of introduced traits. A second example is the use of genome editing to generate small changes at the genetic level, though they may have significant phenotypic alterations, raising specific biosafety considerations e.g. via targeting transcription factors to induce expression changes to hundreds of genes. Risk assessors need to be equipped on how to address such novel risk considerations with further capacity building tailored to new technologies. 

3) Modelling and use of machine learning/AI in risk assessment is also increasingly being incorporated to address risk uncertainties, which may present risk assessors with a ‘black box’ scenario where there is a lack of ability to analyse and/or independently verify the data provided by developers. Other mechanisms for addressing risk uncertainties are thus needed, with the need for capacity building in this area in order to operationalise the precautionary approach. One example is the introduction of cut-off criteria to provide a step to assess when data is not sufficiently reliable to complete a risk assessment.  For example, cut-off criteria can be stipulated in the context of the receiving environment, and locally relevant risks, knowledge gaps, and uncertainties. Reducing uncertainties may also be aided by capacity building across sectors and disciplines, including civil society, in order to reduce knowledge gaps as much as possible, including in relation to biosafety, socio-economic, and suitability aspects. 

Thank you very much,

Eva Sirinathsinghji

My name is Mutibo Chijikwa, based in Senegal, and I serve as Senior Programme Officer for Biosafety at AUDA–NEPAD, where I lead efforts to strengthen biosafety systems across African Union Member States. This response is for to Question 1 under this topic.

Strengthening of Biosafety Regulatory Frameworks and Institutional Collaboration: African parties have made progress in building capacity and establishing functioning biosafety regulatory frameworks, with some even having commercialised LM crops. Though progress has been made, more effort is needed to harmonize regulatory systems, policies and legislation to create a more centralised approach to the implementation of biosafety mandates and promote data transportability.

Increased budgetary allocation and investment in implementing regulatory frameworks: Parties have made significant progress toward sustainable financing by combining national budget allocations with strategic international partnerships. Increased domestic investment in biosafety systems ensures the continuity of essential functions—such as training, public engagement, and regulatory oversight—beyond donor project timelines. This shift enables Parties to better leverage new funding mechanisms like the Cali Fund while strengthening their capacity to implement biodiversity strategies (NBSAPs) and benefit-sharing frameworks to help meet the evolving demands of modern regulatory systems and reduce reliance on short-term funding

Human Resources and Infrastructure: Centres of Excellence have enhanced capacity by lowering testing costs, providing modern and accredited laboratories, and standardizing methodologies. These hubs support knowledge-sharing and help address capacity gaps. However, staff turnover and technological advancement mean continuous capacity building is required. Parties require sustained support for testing methodologies and techniques, infrastructure, consumables, legal agreements and skilled personnel to conduct risk assessments, particularly concerning new and emerging biotechnologies such as synthetic biology and artificial intelligence.

Strengthening Political Commitment and Institutional sustainability: Parties increasingly recognize the importance of integrating biosafety into National Development Plans and agricultural policies, enhancing political ownership, securing funding, and aligning it with national priorities for long-term coherence. To build on this, biosafety should be reinforced as a strategic priority by strengthening institutional frameworks—such as embedding mandates in permanent agencies—to address budget challenges and institutional memory loss. Ongoing engagement with policymakers and knowledge-sharing will sustain momentum and ensure continuity in implementation

Advancing Regional harmonisation and Collaboration: RECs have advanced biosafety harmonization, showcasing the potential of regional cooperation. Building on these efforts, there is an opportunity to further align policies across Parties by fostering knowledge sharing platforms and joint capacity-building initiatives. By developing common frameworks and fully leveraging on existing REC platforms, countries at varying stages of policy development can fast track progress through shared expertise, reducing fragmentation and accelerating implementation

This response is for Question 2

A.3: Timely submission of biosafety information to the Biosafety Clearing-House (BCH) is critical for tracking progress, avoiding duplication of efforts, and guiding targeted capacity-building support under Article 20 of the Protocol. While some African Parties face challenges in reporting, there are opportunities to enhance efficiency and consistency in data sharing.

Needs
a. Legal and administrative frameworks that mandate inter-ministerial data exchange and clarify institutional responsibilities.
b. Investment in ICT systems to digitize biosafety data to allow for real time centralised reporting that is automatically linked to BCH platforms.
c. Capacity development for national officers to not only upload data but to analyze and strategically utilize biosafety information in decision-making and public reporting.


A.4: Compliance reporting plays a vital role in supporting the Protocol's implementation by enabling the Compliance Committee to identify challenges and recommend mitigation measures. While all Parties share this reporting obligation, African Parties can particularly benefit from strategic policy approaches that integrate biosafety compliance with existing regulatory systems and international best practices. Institutionalizing compliance within national policies creates sustainable oversight mechanisms while maximizing available resources through synergies with related monitoring frameworks.
 
Needs
a. Development of national biosafety compliance strategies, aligned with broader regulatory frameworks (e.g., environmental or food safety regimes).
b. Technical assistance to draft or amend biosafety laws with enforceable compliance provisions
c. Specialized training for biosafety officers in legal procedures and scientific risk assessment

A.6: Robust contingency plans supported by coordinated monitoring and response systems are essential for addressing illegal and unintentional transboundary movements of LMOs. While Article 17 of the Cartagena protocol and national laws provide adequate legal foundation, Parties can further enhance implementation through targeted capacity building, strategic technology integration and enhanced regional cooperation to address border management challenges.

Needs
a. Training programs for customs and biosafety officers, on LMO detection and identification, documentation procedures, and emergency response protocols.
b. Investment of detection infrastructure including rapid test kits and integrated digital tracking systems for border monitoring
c. Development of standard operating procedures and regional enforcement protocols, aligned with international best practices for inspections and incident management.

POSTED ON BEHALF OF GALINA MOZGOVA, BELARUS

Good afternoon, dear participants. Many thanks to Ms. Thato Mogapi for moderating this round of discussions.
My name is Galina Mozgova, I am the head of the National Coordination Biosafety Centre, the CPB and the BCH NFP. Since our center is involved not only in educational and outreach activities in the field of biosafety in our country, but also carried out some collaborative projects, including within the framework of the BioBridge project in the CEE and Central Asia region, there are several observations common to the countries in the region:
1. For some countries, the issue of strengthening administrative systems remains important. There could be a number of reasons for this - not quite developed legislation in all or individual areas of biosafety, the lack of a clear definition of institutions responsible for individual biosafety areas, the lack of documented interdepartmental relationships, etc. In this regard, it is important to exchange experience between countries on how to organize everything so that it works. From the point of view of capacity building, it would be useful to organize events under the auspices of the SCBD to exchange experience both in CEE and Central Asia region, and I think this is relevant for other regions as well. I also think that the potential of BioBridge projects in the field of biosafety has not been fully utilized by individual countries; such projects allow us to analyze and assess gaps, hold round tables in the country and discuss what needs to be improved, invite experts from other countries who can provide assistance.
2. In the CEE and Central Asia region there is still a great need for training in several LMO biosafety areas covered by the Action Plan for different stakeholders.
In particular, training of government agencies in the field of ensuring the safety of genetic engineering activities. An important point is still the need for ongoing training in LMO risk assessment methods, taking into account new types of LMOs, synthetic biology objects, as well as an explanation of the regulatory rules and best practices for regulating new generations of LMOs. The region still has a significant need for practical training in the laboratory detection and monitoring of LMOs, including new generations of LMOs, products containing LMOs, and complex products. This training should also encompass the specifics of sample preparation for products of different compositions, as well as laboratory detection standards. A great deal of interest from several countries in the region focused on how to address socio-economic issues (Objective A9).
3. There is also a need for up-to-date practical recommendations for customs officers in simple terms about what GMOs are, what types of GMOs exist, what information should be sought in the shipping documentation, which laboratories to contact in case of doubts about consignments, what approaches countries have, including those using the modern technologies, e.g. special computer programs, to simplify the work of customs officers, relevant information from the BCH, and other very practical information described in simple understandable language, as well as training in this area. It seems to me that it would also be very good to update the technical series, a methodological guide for customs officers for capacity building.
4. Regarding A6 and A8 of the Plan and strengthening the potential of the laboratories for LMO detection, it should be noted that periodic interlaboratory comparisons are necessary to maintain laboratory accreditation and quality of work. But the services provided by various comparison companies are often quite expensive for countries of the CEE and Central Asia Region. For capacity development and implementation of the area for capacity building, Objectives A6 and A8 of the Plan, it would be very good to discuss how the potential of the network of LMO detection laboratories that currently exists under the CBD could be used for organizing such professional comparisons.
In conclusion, it is worth noting that for capacity-building, regional training and education conducted by the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity in various areas of biosafety, and the BCH trainings provided by the network of the BCH regional advisers play a great role in implementing and strengthening capacity. I would like to emphasize the importance of such training in the area of risk assessment and LMO detection. At the same time, in order to implement the Plan, in my opinion, it is important to support new practical training, for example, practical training directly aimed at customs officers. Also of great importance for capacity building are the technical series developed by the Secretariat, and their continuous maintenance and updating.

Best regards,
Galina Mozgova

This response is for question 2.

A.9:The Protocol's approach under Article 26 provides a vital framework for context-specific socio-economic considerations in LMO decision-making. While most African Parties' laws already incorporate provisions for socio economic assessment in decision-making particularly regarding environmental impacts, practical implementation faces some challenges.
Needs
a. Development of context-sensitive assessment tools that incorporate Africa’s unique socio-economic context, including smallholder farming systems and informal markets.
b. Formation of multi-stakeholder platforms to incorporate diverse perspectives from farmers, consumers, researchers and policymakers.
c. Cross-disciplinary capacity development involving economists, sociologists, ecologists, and legal experts to provide comprehensive impact assessments.
d. Creation of standardized framework and metrics systematically integrating socio-economic risks and benefits into biosafety decisions.

B.3: Effective public engagement is essential for transparent and inclusive biosafety governance and Parties have rolled out various platforms to facilitate engagement of the public. There is no thing as too much public engagement, Parties can strengthen implementation by improving science communication, and creating inclusive platforms for dialogue, particularly in rural communities being most affected by LMO decisions.

Needs

a) Legal mandates to institutionalize public participation in relevant phases of LMO evaluation and approval.
b) Development of culturally appropriate awareness materials, including local-language translations, community radio programs, and visual storytelling tools.
c) Creation of grassroots engagement platforms, through local governments or civil society to ensure marginalized groups contribute to biosafety discussions.


Conclusion

While these topics may not have featured in the recent submissions, they are priority topics that represent essential capacity needs that have been consistently raised in various forums under the Protocol and should be included. The identified priorities must be reflected in the Capacity-building Action Plan to ensure comprehensive implementation support. Incorporating these priorities will trigger the engagement of specialized institutions with relevant expertise to deliver targeted capacity-building programs where Parties need them most.

Dear Mr Thato Mogapi, thanks for moderating this discussion.

My name is Pedro Rocha, currently coordinator of biotechnology and biosafety (B&B) at the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation of Agriculture (IICA). IICA is the technical arm of the Inter-American system for supporting agriculture development in its 32 members countries of the Americas.

IICA has focused its efforts on B&B in three key areas (i) Technical assistance to ministries of agriculture—and, occasionally, to ministries of the environment—to strengthen national capacities in biotechnology and biosafety; (ii) Support for effective scientific communication in biotechnology, by organizing or co-organizing technical events to foster informed dialogue among key stakeholders; and (iii) Ongoing capacity-building, through over 100 virtual sessions and more than 40 in-person seminars and workshops, covering CPB topics such as environmental risk assessment and the exchange of national and regional experiences (at regulatory, scientific and commercial levels).

IICA has acted as a facilitator of information exchange between regulators, academia, and the private sector, promoting respectful, evidence-based dialogue. With technical input from well recognized experts (regulators, academics, researchers) and specialists from CBD and CPB, IICA has contributed to the exchange of information and to the development of biosafety regulatory frameworks in several countries in the hemisphere, supporting the responsible and science-based adoption of biotechnology in the region.

Regarding your question, and based on what we have found through the years, the main needs and challenges are:
1. In general, the countries of Latin America are not interested in having harmonized policies. They are more committed to the development of REGULATORY COOPERATION based on HARMONIZED CRITERIA. This has been used and has demonstrated its advantages and benefits from a regulatory and trade perspective.
2. Training and capacity development should be regular activities, as there is significant staff turnover, and therefore it is necessary to ensure that new officials not only have theoretical information but also a way to access practical experiences from others.
3. A recurring theme for training and capacity development is environmental risk assessment but based on real cases rather than guidelines.
4. Important strengthening the LMO detection and monitoring training.
5. It is useful to have a training session on practicalities about the functioning of CBD, CPB, COPs and COP-MOPs, and use of information exchange platforms such as BCH.
6. There are some additional topics not directly involved with CPB that biotech regulators are interested on, such as Synthetic Biology, Digital Sequencing Information, Gene Editing, etc.
7. A good way to contribute to training and capacity building is to update the information available in BCH. So, the invitations of the countries to upload their relevant information in a timely manner.
8. Financing biosafety training is a major issue, even more if we consider that many of the activities carried out by several institutions and agencies, including IICA, have mainly been possible thanks to the support of non-CPB members such as United States and Canada.
9. Although virtual training has proven to be useful, face-to-face training is preferable.

Finally, I would like to thank the kind mentions that some of the participants in this forum have made about the IICA.

Best regards,
Pedro

1- In order to stratheden capacity-building capacities on biosafety, for Argentina is important to enhance financial mechanisms to support training courses and activities where experienced countries provide information, background and knowledge to inexperienced countries or with lack of experience. Matters related to administrative system flow and how conducting risk assessment of LMOs. In this sense, Argentina offers its experience and expertise.

2- Argentina considers that the supporting of biosafety capacity-building in countries whose lack of capacities and experience help to achieve with the implementing the Capacity-building Action Plan for the Protocol and its goals.

Les besoins prioritaires en matière de renforcement de capacités au niveau de l'Agence nationale de biosécurité du Burkina Faso se situent à deux niveaux.
Le premier  niveau nécessite que les régulateurs soient bien formé sur les nouvelles techniques comme l'édition du génome et le gene drive ainsi que sur leur évaluation. Pour le cas spécifique du gene drive, en plus de l'évaluation, il y a le suivi dans l'environnement qui reste un défis et aussi des mécanismes de biosécurité qui seront mis en place pour l'arrêter en cas de risques avérés.
Le deuxième axe porte sur le renforcement de capacités des politiques et des learders d'opinion. Pour terminer sur cette partie, il est nécessaire d'encourager l'enseignement et la formation sur les biotechnologies et la biosécurité.  Cela permettra d'avoir de l'expertise nationale de qualité et en nombre suffisant pour relever les défis liés à la règlementation de l'édition génomique et le gene drive.

The priority capacity-building needs at the National Biosafety Agency of Burkina Faso are twofold.
The first level requires regulators to be well-trained in new techniques such as genome editing and gene drive, as well as in their evaluation. In the specific case of gene drive, in addition to evaluation, there is the challenge of environmental monitoring, as well as biosafety mechanisms that will be put in place to stop it in the event of proven risks.
The second level focuses on capacity building for policymakers and opinion leaders. To conclude this section, it is essential to promote education and training in biotechnology and biosafety. This will provide sufficient high-quality national expertise to address the challenges associated with the regulation of genome editing and gene drive.

Dear participants,

I would like to thank Ms. Thato Mogapi for a very successful moderation of the discussion on the suggested topic.
My name is Angela Lozan, I am a project manager at the National Environmental Projects Implementation Office of the Ministry of Environment of Moldova. Currently I am coordinating the MSP GEF/UNEP project  Biosecurity Implementation Framework for the Management of Biological Resources in Moldova. The project objective is to strengthen institutional biosecurity frameworks in the management of invasive alien species and living modified organisms through a coordinated risk analysis measures in line with the Convention of Biological Diversity, Cartagena Protocol, its Supplementary Protocol and relevant Invasive Alien Species regulations in Moldova. The project has the following components:
Component 1: Effective Biosecurity Legislative, Policy, Regulatory and Institutional Frameworks
Component 2: Integration of biosecurity into Biological resource management
Component 3: A unified system for Knowledge management, Public awareness, Education, Communication on biosecurity

The project outputs are focused to the national needs to improve national capacities and meeting the provisions of the Cartagena Protocol and its Supplementary protocol:
- National policy for integrated bioresource management ensuring biosecurity for IAS and LMOs developed with special attention to gender participation as part of the new NBSAP 2030 in line with the GBF;
- Subsidiary regulation (law) on both IAS and LMOs developed, existing legislation is strengthened for more effective biosecurity and regulations on Liability and Redress;
- National capacities (with specific attention to gender equality) in risk analysis frameworks, detection and identification for monitoring and management for LMOs IAS strengthened with equipment, defined guidelines and manuals;
- Unified Portal for Information Sharing in line with the CBD’s Integrated approach on Clearing Houses set up with the requisite national database and registers for IAS and LMOs, including GIS mapping and spatial planning resources;
- Awareness programs, training and educational curricula  on LMOs and IAS with special attention to gender equality developed and implemented.

A training on risk assessment and risk management has been held in June in Chisinau and conducted by the International experts to knowledge management and skills for specific procedures of risk assessment and management for LMOs, based on real case studies of RA for GM sugar beet, corn, soybean etc. and involved specific personnel and risk assessors form laboratory, academia and research, sectorial governmental officers and decision makers, NGOs, students of biological faculty etc.

Further needs should be addressed to improve capacities for laboratory detection and identification, monitoring of LMOs, liability and redress mechanisms, BCH and exchange of information, public awareness and public participation to decision making process.
A regional and sub-regional communication and exchange of information would better facilitate risk management and prevention measures, redress biodiversity and ecosystem conservation.

Best,
Angela Lozan, PhD

Dear Ms. Angela Lozan

Thank you very much for sharing your views and the project you are currently coordinating, which I have noted, aims to improve national capacities. You are welcome to submit your project on the Capacity Development Initiative in the BCH if you have not had a chance to submit (see topic 2). Here is the link:

https://bch.cbd.int/en/search?currentPage=1&schema=capacityBuildingInitiative

Kind regards
Ms Thato Mogapi

Toutes mes félicitations pour cette rapide synthèse. Merci pour la modération.

Many thanks to the CBD Secretariat for the opportunity to share perspectives via this online forum and to Ms. Thato Mogapi for her excellent moderation. My name is Justin Overcash and I am a Technical Expert in Genetic Biocontrol, Regulation and Policy at the GeneConvene Global Collaborative within The Foundation for the National Institutes of Health, USA. I have served as a risk assessment expert in the most recent CBD RA/RM AHTEG and as a risk assessor and GMO product reviewer in the US federal regulatory system.

I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to this important discussion on capacity-building for the effective implementation of the Cartagena Protocol. I would like to comment specifically on Goal B.3 (public participation) and Goal A.6 (illegal and unintentional transboundary movements of LMOs), which has been noted as underrepresented in the recent summary of submissions (https://www.cbd.int/meetings/CP-CB-OM-2025-01). From GeneConvene’s perspective, these are indeed critical areas that warrant focused attention and sustained investment.

On Goal B.3, we strongly agree that enhancing public awareness and participation is essential to the long-term success and legitimacy of biosafety decision-making. GeneConvene has supported capacity-building efforts that empower national authorities, scientists, and communicators to engage with the public more effectively. This includes facilitating regional and forum on science communication, supporting multi-country perception studies, and contributing to the development of educational materials tailored to different audiences. These efforts have reinforced the importance of transparency, dialogue, and inclusion—particularly when addressing emerging biotechnologies.

For Goal A.6, we have observed that many national systems would benefit from strengthened infrastructure and training to detect, document, and appropriately respond to unintentional and illegal transboundary movements. GeneConvene has supported tailored, in-country biosafety trainings that include modules on documentation, international shipping standards, and safe handling practices for LMOs. These engagements underscore the importance of practical tools, SOPs, and sustained technical support for competent authorities.

In both cases, we have found that context-specific, collaborative approaches—developed in partnership with local institutions—are critical for building trust and strengthening capacity. GeneConvene remains committed to supporting Parties as they advance implementation of the Capacity-building Action Plan and uphold the objectives of the Cartagena Protocol.
Thanks,
Justin Overcash

Hi, my name is Laura Hernández Padilla, Ph.D. in Biological Sciences with a specialization in Experimental Biology. Researcher for Mexico at the UMSNH assigned to the Interministerial Commission on Biosafety of Genetically Modified Organisms (CIBIOGEM), NFP for the Cartagena Protocol. Actively participates in national projects, including the National Laboratory for Agri-food Biosafety, which address critical challenges such as agri-food biosafety and the detection of genetically modified organisms in Mexico.

In relation to the main needs and priority challenges for capacity-building in the implementation of the Capacity-Building Action Plan, it is essential to recognize the vulnerabilities and responsibilities of countries that are centers of origin and diversification of key crops. Mexico is the center of origin and diversification for maize, as well as several other globally important crops. Peasant and smallholder farming systems in the country continue to conserve and evolve native maize varieties, thereby playing a crucial role in maintaining global agrobiodiversity. However, these traditional systems are increasingly threatened by the introduction and spread of GMO, particularly genetically modified maize, and by the widespread use of hazardous herbicides such as glyphosate, which poses well-documented risks to both human health and the environment. In this context, we identify the following as key needs and priority challenges for capacity-building in the implementation of the Capacity-Building Action Plan:
1.- The risk assessment of living modified organisms (LMOs) in the Mexican context, considering both environmental and socio-cultural aspects.
2.- The risk management and analysis of LMOs, including long-term monitoring, contingency planning, and decision-making processes based on scientific, ethical, and precautionary principles.
These priorities are aligned with Target 17 of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, and National Target 17.1 and 17.2, which emphasizes the importance of biosafety, including the traceability and monitoring of LMO, as essential elements for safeguarding biodiversity and ensuring responsible biotechnology use.

Dear colleagues,
I´m Laura Hernández Padilla, Ph.D. in Biological Sciences with a specialization in Experimental Biology. Researcher for Mexico at the UMSNH assigned to the Interministerial Commission on Biosafety of Genetically Modified Organisms (CIBIOGEM), NFP for the Cartagena Protocol. Actively participates in national projects, including the National Laboratory for Agri-food Biosafety, which address critical challenges such as agri-food biosafety and the detection of genetically modified organisms in Mexico.
In relation to the implementation of regulations, information exchange, administrative system strengthening, and the conduct of risk assessments of LMO, Mexico has launched an initiative focused on the sustainable monitoring of transgenes and pesticides in food systems. This initiative is led by the National Laboratory for Agri-food Biosafety (LNC-BIOSAA) a key institution operating within the national biosafety framework and aligned with the Presidential Decree banning genetically modified maize and glyphosate. Based on a thorough review and in line with Objective A8 of the Capacity-Building Action Plan, which calls for the creation and strengthening of LMO identification networks, the following priorities have been identified:
1.        Financial support to strengthen infrastructure in national laboratories with the capacity to detect, identify, and quantify LMO.
2.        Subsequent financial assistance to achieve accreditation and certification of these laboratories, ensuring they meet technical and quality standards for molecular analysis related to LMO monitoring.

This initiative aligns with national strategies such as PRONACES and development programs like Sembrando Vida, contributing to the co-construction of territorial solutions that integrate food security, environmental health, and rural development.
Moreover, it reinforces Mexico’s international commitments under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, particularly by contributing to:
·       Target 17 – strengthening biosafety and traceability mechanisms;
·       Target 7 – reducing pollution from hazardous substances;
·       Target 20 – protecting and promoting traditional knowledge;
·       Target 19 – mobilizing financial and technical resources.

Dear Colleagues,
 
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this forum.
 
My name is Selene Sánchez Mendoza, Deputy Director of Technological and Scientific Research at Executive Secretariat of Intersecretarial Comission on GMO Biosafety in México, and part of Cartagena Protocol NFP team. 

Based on the Capacity-building Action Plan, with regard to Goal A.6 on illegal and unintentional transboundary movements of GM crops, for Mexico, as a country of origin and diversification of various crops, including corn, the development and establishment of effective detection and reporting systems to detect and respond to illegal transboundary movements of GM crops, with a special emphasis on corn, is of paramount importance.

In Mexico, a country where, in 2023, approximately 19 million tons of corn grain were imported, a high proportion of which were from countries with a high presence of genetically modified crops, it is of utmost importance to establish effective administrative, technical, and legal measures to address illegal transboundary movements of GM grains that are not declared as such and are therefore not subject to the corresponding administrative provisions.

Therefore, the need to develop coordinated strategies for the development of effective detection and notification systems to address both unintentional and illegal transboundary movements, as indicated in Articles 17 and 25 of the Cartagena Protocol, is recognized and emphasized.

This is closely related to Goals A.6. A.7, A8 and A9, since the development of regulatory and administrative frameworks that allow for the establishment and operation of traceability and labeling systems for products containing ingredients derived from GMOs, as indicated in Article 18 of the Protocol, is of great importance for achieving the objective of the Protocol itself.

Thank you all

Best regards,

Selene

Dear colleagues,

My name is Nancy Serrano Silva. I hold a Ph.D. in Biotechnology and I am part of the “Investigadoras e Investigadores por México” program of “Secretaría de Ciencia, Humanidades, Tecnología e Innovación - SECIHTI”. I am currently assigned to the Executive Secretariat of CIBIOGEM, where I am researching Integral Biosafety for the Food Sovereignty of Mexico. Thank you for the opportunity to join this Online Forum. 

In Mexico — center of origin, domestication, and diversification of maize — one of the main challenges for implementing the Capacity-building Action Plan on Biosafety is the lack of financial support for projects that can operationalize existing regulatory frameworks. Although significant research has been conducted on the detection and monitoring of transgenes in maize, the resources and institutional conditions necessary to scale up these capacities to the level required by the Mexican Biosafety Law (LBOGM) and the Cartagena Protocol are still lacking (this compromises the fulfillment of Goals A.1, A.4, A.5, A.6, A.7, A.8).

A critical example of this need is the urgent development of an integrated model for the detection, traceability, and analysis of wind-dispersed genetically modified (GM) maize pollen in agroecosystems, in response to the growing risk of unintended genetic introgression into native and landrace maize varieties. This gene flow mechanism, through windborne pollen, has been underestimated in most conventional methodologies, which focus mainly on seed or grain.

Developing such integrated models — combining aerobiology, molecular genetics, geospatial analysis, and participatory monitoring — is a priority for countries like Mexico, where biocultural diversity and food sovereignty are deeply interconnected.

One of the most pressing challenges is establishing robust biosafety evaluation and monitoring systems. However, the lack of sustained funding limits the implementation of these capabilities, as well as the training of technical personnel and the coordination among communities, academia, and regulatory authorities.

It is essential that the Action Plan includes dedicated support for projects that go beyond traditional evaluation frameworks, incorporating new risk vectors (such as pollen), and promoting preventive, territorial, and participatory approaches to LMO governance.

I’m Consuelo López López,  I am a Director of Information and Research Promotion of the Executive Secretariat of Cibiogem in Mexico, and NFP of Biosafety Clearing House. First, I'd like to thank the people who coordinate this online forum.

In response to question 1, the Executive Secretariat of CIBIOGEM has identified several needs, which focus on strengthening national regulatory frameworks for GMO risk analysis and assessment and traceability, through legal harmonization and updating. Financial support to carry out the accreditation and certification of national laboratories that have the technical capacity and infrastructure to perform molecular analyses related to the detection, identification and quantification of GMO. In addition, there is a need to encourage the generation of GMO biosafety research projects, national biotechnological developments and address socio-economic considerations related to GMO.

In this sense, Mexico has given attention to Goals A1, A2, A9, B1, B3 and B4 of the Action Plan, where the Executive Secretary of the Cibiogem has participated in the Decrees by which various actions are established in the matter of glyphosate and genetically modified maize, the General Law on Adequate and Sustainable Food. Updated the "Protocol to ensure self-determination, within the framework of the consultation mechanism for indigenous, Afro-Mexican and similar peoples and communities in relation to applications for the release into the environment of genetically modified organisms (GMO),"  Work started on the Strategy to establish public policy for traceability of genetically modified maize, and national biodiversity targets were developed in line with the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (MMB-KM).

It is important to highlight the Presidential Decree establishing various actions on glyphosate and genetically modified maize, with the aim of protecting the right to health and a healthy environment, native maize, milpa, biocultural wealth, of rural communities and the gastronomic heritage, as well as ensuring nutritious, sufficient and quality food.

In addition, it is very important to mention that at the beginning of the current federal administration was signed the "Decree reforming and adding articles 4 and 27 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States on conservation and protection of native corn",  where it is stated that everyone has the right to sufficient nutritious and quality food, and that the cultivation of maize must be free from genetic modifications, in addition to which biodiversity, food sovereignty and its agro-ecological management will be prioritized. Highlights Mexico as the center of origin and diversity of corn, which is an element of national identity, basic food for the people of Mexico and the basis of the existence of indigenous and Afro-Mexican peoples.

I’d like to thank Ms. Thato Mogapi for moderating this topic. My name is David Castro, Director of Genetic Resources & Biosafety at the Ministry of Environment of Perú.

In addition to all the valuable contributions shared throughout this week, I consider biosafety topics must be integrated into the academic curricula of biological, agronomic, and related sciences undergraduate programs to build long-term national expertise. Securing adequate financial resources, both domestic and international, is critical for maintaining and expanding capacity-building efforts—such as laboratory infrastructure, information systems, and community outreach.

Best regards.

Dear colleagues,  

My name is Humberto Peraza Villarreal. I hold a PhD in Biological Sciences and currently serve as subdirector of Social Engagement and Socioeconomic Research at the Executive Secretariat of Cibiogem in Mexico. I would like to begin by thanking the organizers of this online forum for providing us with this space for dialogue and exchange of experiences.
Regarding Objective A.9, related to socioeconomic considerations (SEC) related to LMO, one of the main challenges has been the lack of clear and binding regulatory frameworks defining how to incorporate these elements into decision-making processes. Furthermore, there is a methodological limitation for comprehensively assessing social, economic, environmental, public health, and biocultural impacts, representing s a particular challenge in a megadiverse and multicultural country like Mexico.
Another fundamental challenge is strengthening technical and institutional capacities to conduct interdisciplinary analyses that include these dimensions, along with environmental risk assessments. In this context, Mexico has made progress in incorporating SEC through the implementation of the Protocol to guarantee self-determination, within the framework of the consultation mechanism for indigenous, Afro-Mexican, and comparable peoples and communities, regarding requests for the release into the environment of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO). Consult at: https://cibiogem.secihti.mx/normatividad-distribuidor/normatividad-vigente-act/normativa-general-y-federal/  
This has involved developing feasibility assessments for experimental release evaluations related to these applications. These actions have enabled the SEC to adopt a more comprehensive approach to risk assessments, considering not only economic impacts but also environmental, health, cultural, and social impacts on the community.
Furthermore, the SEC has been incorporated into working groups on genetically modified cotton, GMO-free zones, and Indigenous consultation processes, and workshops and outreach materials have been developed to address these issues with a broad segment of the population.
Regarding Objective B.3, related to public participation in matters concerning LMO, one of the main challenges has been to overcome the historic gap between the general public and regulatory processes, particularly in the case of rural, peasant, Indigenous, and Afro-Mexican communities. In response to this challenge, the Inter-Secretarial Commission on Biosafety of Genetically Modified Organisms (Cibiogem) has committed to strengthening effective, informed, and inclusive public participation. 
As part of this effort, work is underway to develop a Digital Platform for Social Engagement on the Biosafety of GMO, conceived as a space to facilitate dialogue between society and public institutions, promote collective reflection, and encourage collaboration in the design, implementation, and monitoring of public policies on GMO biosafety. This platform is based on principles such as the recognition of the human right to science, open and inclusive access to scientific, humanistic, and technological knowledge, and the visibility of local knowledge, experiences, and territorial practices related to biosafety. Additionally, it aims to provide legal and scientific support to projects, protocols, and actions being developed in the country, with a special focus on participatory biosafety strategies.

UNEP/SCBD/Biosafety#12696

Dear Colleagues,

I am Edel-Quinn Agbaegbu, from EWHC, Nigeria. Based on the information from governments and organizations on implementing or funding biosafety capacity-building activities, the key capacity-building priority needs, to implement the Capacity-building Action Plan is to strengthen capacity-building, promote development and access to innovation, transfer of technology, as well as monitoring and assessment of outcome, to meet the need for effective implementation of the action plan, particularly in the developing countries. The major challenge is to enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted capacity-building in developing countries, to support national action plans. 

From the above submission, the priority needs for Goals, A3, A4, A6 and A9 is to strengthen capacity and promote development. The major challenge here is accessing international support to for effective implementation and monitoring on illegal and unintentional trans-boundary movements of LMOs, In the case of B3, the priority needs include; promote development, access to information and innovation, and transfer of technology. The main challenge here is funding capacity, most especially for low income countries.

A.A.I. Mandakini Amarasinghe, Sri Lanka

Greetings to all, and thank you to our moderator and all participants for the interesting interventions.

My name is Mandakini Amarasinghe, and I am an Environmental Officer working at the National Competent Authority of Sri Lanka.The following responses are provided by the participants of the forum from the Central Environmental Authority, which serves as the National Competent Authority. The Ministry of Environment, Sri Lanka, acts as the National Focal Point of the Convention.

Sri Lanka is currently facing several key issues in implementing effective biosafety measures. These include the lack of LMO analysis laboratories and technical infrastructure within the national competent authority, which hampers the ability to detect and manage LMOs effectively. Another major challenge is the inadequate funding for biosafety implementation and monitoring mechanisms, which limits the progress of ongoing and future initiatives. There is also limited technical expertise in modern biotechnology and risk analysis (risk assessment, risk management risk communication.), which affects proper risk assessment and decision-making. In addition, there is a need to strengthen the administrative systems to ensure better coordination and enforcement of biosafety regulations. A lack of awareness among stakeholders and the general public further hinders the successful implementation of biosafety frameworks.

To overcome these challenges, the following priority areas have been identified. First is the establishment of a national biosafety laboratory with LMO detection capacity within the national competent authority, which would significantly enhance national capabilities. It is also important to focus on capacity-building for stakeholders with the experience sharing with other countries, allowing Sri Lanka to benefit from international best practices. Efforts must also be directed at strengthening biosafety enforcement mechanisms to ensure regulatory compliance. In parallel, public education campaigns on biosafety and modern biotechnology training programmes are vital to raise awareness and build support. Another key priority is the need for risk analysis with aliens with the protocol guidelines, to align national processes with international biosafety standards.

To address these priorities, several immediate needs must be met. There is an urgent requirement for dedicated financial support for biosafety infrastructure, which is foundational for sustainable implementation. In addition, regional cooperation on biosafety training, legal enforcement, and technology sharing should be strengthened to build collective capacity in the region. Finally, regional cooperation for monitoring illegal LMO imports and unintentional releases, and legal enforcement is essential to manage cross-border biosafety risks effectively and uphold biosafety commitments.

Dear Forum participants,

Thank you all very much for your contributions to the Online Forum on Capacity-building for Biosafety. The Forum is now closed. Please note that all the postings will remain under each topic.

There will be a complete moderator’s summary of information and recommendations of the three topics made available in the coming weeks. The information will also be used to develop an information document for the twelfth Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties (COP-MOP 12) to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2026.

We look forward to your continued contribution to the implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the Capacity-building Action Plan for the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. We also encourage the continuation of governments and organizations to, on a regular basis, submit information on implementing or funding biosafety capacity-building activities in the Capacity Development Initiative in the BCH at https://bch.cbd.int/en/register/CDI/new and any resources at https://bch.cbd.int/en/register/VLR/new.

Thank you.

Best regards,
Ms Thato Mogapi

POSTED ON BEHALF OF THE MODERATOR OF THE FORUM

Dear Forum participants,

Thank you all again for your participation in the Online Forum on Capacity-building for Biosafety.

Please find a link of the moderators' summary of the Online Forum at https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/fb84/f0bc/60f3fb9bed089cc280a2b49d/cp-cb-om-2025-01-02-en.pdf

Best regards,

Ms. Thato Mogapi