El Centro de Intercambio de Información sobre Seguridad de la Biotecnología (CIISB) es una plataforma en línea de intercambio de información sobre organismos vivos modificados (OVM) y una herramienta fundamental para facilitar la aplicación del Protocolo de Cartagena sobre Seguridad de la Biotecnología.

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08 jun. 2026
 
BCH Activity Spotlight: Zimbabwe

Recognizing Parties with recent record publications or updates, 12 - 18 October

13 nov. 2025
 
Congratulations to all countries that submitted their Fifth National Report by the deadline!

If you have not yet done so, please submit as soon as possible!

02 oct. 2026
 
Related Events at CP-MOP12 in Yerevan, Armenia

Learn more about the events taking place during CP-MOP 12

Partes en el Cartagena Protocol

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Registros nacionales


Publicado recientemente
01 nov. 2026Dr Felicien AMAKPE

Ministere du Cadre Vie et des Transports en Charge du Developpement Durable | Biotechnology research and development, Environmental risk assessment, Capacity development, Information and knowledge management, Policy and legal, Public awareness, education and participation, including access to information, Risk management, Socio-economic considerations, Trade issues, Traditional knowledge, invasive alien species, pollinator

Biosafety ExpertBeninbch-exp-bj-301707-1
29 oct. 2026Dr Xavier Mhike

CIMMYT | Biotechnology research and development, Capacity development

Biosafety ExpertZimbabwebch-exp-zw-301667-1
28 oct. 2026Fifth National Report on the Implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety - Lebanon

Fifth National Report on the Implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety - Lebanon

26 oct. 2026Mr. Kwame Dei Asamoah-Okyere

Cartagena Protocol National Focal Point | BCH National Focal Point | Emergency Measures (Article 17) Contact Point

National Focal PointGhanachm-nfp-gh-277536-4

Registros de referencia


Publicado recientemente
20 oct. 2026Kyrgyzstandard and FAO Strengthen the Capacity of the Kyrgyz Republic in the Field of Biosafety

As part of the implementation of the agreement between the Center for Standardization and Metrology under the Ministry of Economy and Commerce of the Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstandard) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) on strengthening technical capacity and developing technical guidelines on biosafety in accordance with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in the Kyrgyz Republic, a series of awareness-raising seminars was conducted.

BCH Newsbch-bchn-scbd-301624-1
12 oct. 2026Biosafety Technical Series 08: Legislating for Biosafety: A Legal Diagnostic Tool to implement the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and its Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress (Publication Date: Oct 2026)

Table of Contents: 1. Introductory Background 1.1 Brief overview of the requirements under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 1.2 Brief overview of the requirements under the Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol 1.3 Implementation by Parties 2. National Legislative Process 2.1 Inclusive and participatory process 2.2 Legal Assessment Report 2.3 Legislative solutions 2.4 Administrative tasks 3. Legal Diagnostic Tool 3.1 Background 3.2 Using the Tool 3.3 Target audience 3.4 Inclusions, exclusions and limitations Annex I: Legal Diagnostic Tool

08 oct. 2026Thirty years of glyphosate-resistant crops and weeds: Current situation and future prospects (Publication Date: Feb 2026)

Abstract: Glyphosate, a broad-spectrum herbicide targeting 5-enolpyruvylshikimate-3-phosphate synthase, was first commercialized in 1974. Its use increased significantly following the introduction of glyphosate-resistant (GR) crops in 1996 and the expiration of its patent in 2000, making it the most used herbicide worldwide. Intensive reliance on glyphosate has selected for GR weed populations, with the first documented case reported also in 1996. Glyphosate resistance now has evolved in 62 weed species across 31 countries, often involving multiple other herbicide modes of action and thereby complicating chemical control. The highest incidence has occurred in regions with extensive GR crop cultivation, particularly the United States, Brazil, and Argentina, where glyphosate has been used for years as the sole or major herbicide. Apparent disparities among countries largely reflect differences in the timing and reporting of first unique resistance cases, rather than actual differences in the overall prevalence of GR weeds. GR weeds possess the greatest diversity of resistance mechanisms described for any herbicide, encompassing both target-site and non-target-site resistance mechanisms, frequently in combination. In many cases, resistance traits that provide low resistance levels have combined over time to provide more robust resistance (creeping resistance). Evolution and spread of glyphosate resistance are influenced by frequency of use, herbicide dose, phenological stage, pollination biology, gene flow, and dissemination of GR seeds or propagules via contaminated seed/grain lots and machinery. Glyphosate resistance and controversies regarding environmental and health issues have so far not resulted in marked reductions in glyphosate use nor in the introduction of a herbicide or other technology that is as effective and economical as glyphosate in managing weeds. This review synthesizes current knowledge of glyphosate resistance and its mechanisms, highlighting existing gaps, and discusses potential scenarios for the future of glyphosate and GR crops. © 2026 The Author(s). Pest Management Science published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society of Chemical Industry.

02 oct. 2026Driving Harm, Reversing Precaution? An Analysis of the Additional Voluntary Guidance Materials on Risk Assessment of LMOs Containing Engineered Gene Drives (Publication Date: Jul 2026)

Author summary: Living modified organisms containing engineered gene drives (EGD-LMOs) are designed to spread genetic modifications through wild populations and persist – a novel technology that brings with it fresh biosafety challenges. In light of these concerns, a set of guidance materials to support risk assessment of EGD-LMOs has been drawn up by a group of experts and welcomed by Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. However, the guidance materials advocate a narrow approach under which only what are identified as “plausible pathways to harm” are selected for assessment. This methodology fails to sufficiently address the central risks of gene drives arising from their very design objective – spread and persistence. Instead of being limited in scope, risk assessment should cast the net widely to capture all potential harms of EGD-LMOs. Only then will it align with the precautionary principle that is enshrined in the Cartagena Protocol and that will ensure adequate protection from the possible adverse effects of this controversial technology on biodiversity and human health.