| | english | español | français |
  Home|RARM Portal|Past Activities|2008-2010|Roadmap for Risk Assessment   Printer-friendly version

Development of the Roadmap for Risk Assessment

Return to the list of threads...
Forum closed. No more comments will be accepted on this forum.
Comments on aspects of the Roadmap [#1250]
Of course I appreciate the good work which has gone into the creation of this draft.  The comments below express concerns/suggestions I wish to have the ATHEG consider.  Many are responsive to comments colleagues have already posted. [The attached version has clearer formatting.]


General Considerations

*Footnote 4—this is only one interpretation of the scope of the Protocol, and I think (having participated in all the negotiations) far too narrow.  Direct adverse effects on human health from an LMO are encompassed in the document’s provisions.  Certainly, humanity residing in a local ecosystem are part of its biodiversity! Also, Article 26 on socioeconomic considerations definitely encompasses human health.

• In the bullet points: the last one (and Discussion Item 4)—Public involvement and dialogue is not a “one-way street” in which the officials put out information to concerned members of the public.  The public needs opportunities to supply input and the procedures should embody a commitment for the officials to seriously consider and respond to such imput.  In addition to being in accord with democratic principles, such mechanisms assure that many the existence and extent of impacts which may be known only to the local population (e.g., changes in crop plants, outbreak of a disease cluster, etc) actually get considered. The identification and evaluation of the extent of any damages definitely requires imput by affected people.
• Next to last bullet point, about uncertainity.  This should definitely mention the Precautionary Approach (or Principle) which is explicitly recited twice in the Protocol’s text. This should guide the work of the assessment.



Step 1

(d) This is perhaps the central and most important principle for a Risk Assessment Roadmap—a rejection of the reductionist approach which is, unfortunately, too often followed currently if any assessment is done at all. There has been far too much discussion of “substantial equivalence” or  the “comparator” without realizing that the basis of the assessment is because there may be important differences. Logical reasoning from knowledge about the component elements in not an adequate substitute for actual test data from the growing and evaluation of the engineered organism (eg, animal studies may be appropriate).

(e) Footnote 11 needs to explicitly cover human health considerations—eg, do the people in the receiving environment have impaired immune systems due to poverty and poor nutrition.  We are not just concerned about the plants and non-human animals in this environment.



Step 2
The “possible displacement of species” is not the only impact path of interest. What if the LMO increases other species (like pest organisms, etc.?) This section needs to be cast in wider terms.

(d) What is “incidental exposure”? The dictionary suggests it means “unplanned” or “secondary”.  The word should be eliminated and a sentence added that “Exposure may occur directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally, etc but all pathways may produce consequences nonetheless and need to be investigated.” The wording in Step 3 is inadequate, since the concepts embodied respectively in steps 2 and 3 have been separated by the drafters of this text.


Step 3, Points to Consider, Rationale

In the real world, effects may not only exist but they will have particular patterns of distribution. Thus certain sub-populations are more heavily impacted than others, and this result shapes the social and political concerns about these impacts, their assessment, the estimation of damages, etc.  For example, are the affected persons infants, of a particular gender or ethnicity (due to ethnic-linked genomic factors), of a particular social/economic class, those in poor health with compromised immune systems, and the like.  The existing text includes nothing about this reality, projecting a false picture that all are equally affected.
Without this level of analysis, it is impossible to seriously undertake the “severity of the consequences” called for under the Rationale.


Related Issues

It should be noted someplace that consequences can be both positive and negative—benefits and damages. Although the aggregation of such information about the impacts is a process for Risk Management, there ought to be a sentence recognizing the relationship of the work of the assessors (and how it is presented) to the decision-making process which the Managers must undertake.

ATHEG should look at he Guidelines published by the Codex Alementarius for assessing GE foods as providing some model elements, suitably expanded to cover all LMOs and to take into account environmental and social factors. These were accepted by 168 countries, without reservations, at the Codex Commission.  See “Guidelines” (below “Standards” in the table)  #44-46, 68 (as amended) at
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/standard_list.do?lang=en


We need to give special attention to assessments of crops engineered with stacked genes and  “pharmacrops” that produce drugs and industrial chemicals. They are not being adequately assessed currently although there is research in the literature that reasonably suggests they may pose special risks to human health, wildlife, and the environment.  In addition, there are real social and economic risks presented by such GE crops to the increasingly important organic sector and to and conventional family farmers

Despite repeated assurances that pharmaceutical and industrial GE crops would be subjected to increased monitoring, reporting, oversight, and management, the USA, for example, has rejected scientifically sound approaches that would have banned outdoor cultivation of GE pharmaceutical-and chemical-producing crops. But such bans are the only way to ensure that untested drugs and industrial chemicals do not end up in our food and environment.  Furthermore, food crops should never be the host species for production of drugs or industrial chemicals. These elements should be indicated in the roadmap.



Discussion Items

Item (2) Despite the well-worn mantra to the contrary, risk assessments contain always subjective elements.  This is not limited to “some cases.”  As I put it at a conference at Harvard (Sept. 2000) chaired by the first Secretary of the CBD, Calestous Juma:

“It is necessary to establish speedy but reliable risk assessment to implement the Precautionary Principle and at the same time take into account consideration of the socio-economic consequences of modern biotechnology . . . .”  German Delegate, CBD COP V, Nairobi, June, 2000
***
The modern era of risk assessment can be traced back to Chauncey Starr’s 1969 article in Science, but it was not perhaps until 1976, with the publication of William Lowrence’s Of Acceptable Risk, that the subjective elements of the process began to get a forthright treatment.  While Lowrence tried to maintain that “risk” was scientifically objective, his discussion of “safety”—as socially acceptable risk—acknowledged the political nature of the overall context of the evaluation. But it is obvious that even a rigid determination of a clear risk—say of injury from skydiving or of winning the lottery jackpot—cannot, in itself, tell us why only some people will accept the risk and jump from an airplane or buy a ticket.  Nor can it tell us the fractional portion of the population willing to undergo such an action.  

However, we must recognize that risk itself (defined as the probability of a hazard) has subjective elements.  And when we affirm this characteristic of risk, the Precautionary Principle can be seen as an inherent aspect of risk assessment, not something alien.

Thus, the proposition is the subjective nature of risk itself, and perforce of its assessment.
Subjective aspects include:
• The choice of phenomena to research [eg, note that only a small amount of public money is devoted to looking at the environmental risks of GMOs];
• The definition of what is a “hazard” (ie, undesirable) [eg, is the displacement of peasant farmers by agribusiness part of the “modernization processes” or an instance of cultural annihilation?];
• How to actually measure a hazard, especially if it combines different aspects not subject to a single metric [eg, the death of a bee deprives us of both honey and pollination];
• How to account for incomplete knowledge, uncertainty, etc. in the nature/consequences of the hazard as well as its probability;
• Who has the burden of proof of developing the necessary data—the proponent of the technology, the regulatory agency, or consumer/environmental citizen organizations?;
• How to account for the social distribution of risk, since hazards impact different sectors/classes in society differently [Monsanto shares may increase in value while family farmers are driven off the land];
• How to discount future events in light of present actions [will an endangered species be driven to extinction before other recovery efforts might be mounted];
• How to monitor a risk, and how much surveillance is “worth” in both monetary and non-monetary terms [eg, the absence of a law requiring the labeling of GE food is also a decision that monitoring the long-term cumulative effects of eating such products is not very important to the decision-makers]; and
• How to balance risks against “benefits“, since benefits involve all the above factors as well

Despite this reality, the current dominant paradigm still claims that risk assessment is a matter for “sound science” rather than politics or social values; these other messy factors must wait until after risk is assessed when they can come into play as part of “risk management.”  This bifurcation is historically traceable to William Ruckelshaus’ second tenure as head of the US EPA.

Ruckelshaus was brought back into that role as part of the larger Reaganite agenda to role back the “democratic paradigm” of public policy and install a “technocratic” one (in the terminology of David Dickson, a report/editor with Science, Nature, New Scientist). This manoeuvre helped that Administration (and subsequent ones) deflect popular environmental and consumer concerns while calling for endless technical studies, thus delaying substantially any constraints on industry practices (and simultaneously enabling citizen groups to be discredited as anti-rational and selfish, and alienating liberal scientists from those movements to which they otherwise might have given pro bono advice.) “Sound science” thus became a mantra to obscure the exercise of partisan political power. 


Item (4) –see above

Item (6) –so it should be stated and referenced

Item (8) what paragraph is being referred to? Hard to give an opinion, since the paragraph in question is not identified

Item(9) See reference to Codex, above.

Item (10) on “subjective interpretation”—but the “evaluation” of impacts is often subjective (note the root word is “value”!)  There is no objective algorithm telling us how to weigh the reduction in honeybees, for example.

Item (11). This is not a function of scientific work alone. See discussion above, for example about affected populations.

Item (12)  Yes, there should be such a paragraph

Item (13)  I agree with the recent comment that co-existence (or “non-coexistence”) is always an assessment question, stemming from impacts on the receiving environment.

Philip L. Bereano
Professor Emeritus,
University of Washington &
Vice President
Washington Biotechnology Action Council
posted on 2009-07-03 18:47 UTC by Dr. Philip L. Bereano, University of Washington
RE: Comments on aspects of the Roadmap [#1253]
I am in agreement with most of the points raised by Professor Bereano in particular his comments on Footnote 4.

I have a number of other concerns about the current version of the Roadmap.
Firstly - while the aim of developing capacity in countriues where a risk assessment framework is not yet available is very important, I am not sure that this document in its present form will do that.  It does not explain what a risk assessment is or what the process of risk assessment is.

Secondly (related and more important)- there is no explicit identification of risks.  Step 1 appears to be a limited attempt to identify possible hazards.  Hazards are not risks.  Step 2 refers to 'likelihood of adverse effects being realised' without any analysis or understanding of what the potential effects might be.  It is far more logical (and makes the process more manageable) if the 'consequences' are considered first (ie the effects if the risks are relaised) and the likelihood/probability of these specific conseuqnces is then analysed/assessed.  For more information on this approach see HB436: 2004 Risk Management Guidelines (Companion to AS/NZS 4360 Risk Management) published by Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand (and basis for ISO 31000 currently at FDIS stage).

Thirdly - of real concern is that the roadmap implies that a risk analysis matrix must be used.  While matrices are a useful tool there is a significant skill involved in applying them correctly so that they are useful and the danger in this case is that people with little experience of risk analysis will apply this as a template.  If examples are to be given then more than one example should be used and the differences should be explained.

Finally, I suggest that a much better discussion on uncertainty - what it is, how and where it arises, and different ways that it might addressed in the risk assessment process is required (CF.Bereano)

Janet Gough
ERMA New Zealand
posted on 2009-07-06 02:09 UTC by Janet Gough, Environmental Protection Authority
RE: Comments on aspects of the Roadmap [#1254]
Would it be possible to post the attachment saved in an earlier version of word for those of us who do not have docx capability?

Thanks
posted on 2009-07-06 02:23 UTC by Mr. Jack Heinemann, University of Canterbury
RE: Comments on aspects of the Roadmap [#1258]
This is the document of Philip Bereano that Jack asked a '.doc' version of.
(edited on 2009-07-06 08:11 UTC by Mr. Hans Bergmans, PRRI)
posted on 2009-07-06 07:05 UTC by Mr. Hans Bergmans, PRRI
RE: Comments on aspects of the Roadmap [#1274]
As a follow up to the contribution by Phil Bereano, I agree with many of the points raised, and hope the SWG will consider these aspects to produce truly a more comprehensive and thorough road map. A few comments:

1) On the precautionary approach (including DI2): Phils comment is an important reminder that our work, as outlined in Article 1 of the protocol, should be guided by a precautionary approach.  This can be conceptualized withink many applicable dimensions. From how we choose to define issues, formulate criteria, prioritize concerns, set baselines and standards, draw boundaries, formulate hypotheses, deal with uncertainties, etc. that go into the framing of the risk assessment. This is the value of the “scoping/context” phase, to set these type of subjective criteria from the outset, as a metric to guide the RA process and ensure it has met the desired objectives, and if not, revisited.

Of course these are subjective elements, and Phil outlines others, that are part of the initial formulation. Note that this is no different than the subjective criteria necessary when one deals with a purely scientific issue or question: We would still need to decide on a model, determine sample size, formulate hypotheses, set error levels and confidence intervals, decide on a p value, and formulate criteria for interpretation.  That is to say, subjective elements are also inherent to the scientific enterprise. The objectivity in “doing” science comes through a faithful adherence to the standards one has set to guide the work. This is a small but important distinction, yet illustrates the normative nature of the task at hand. Again, the precautionary principle applies.

2) Step 4: Risk estimates in the face of uncertainty. One could argue that without a treatment of uncertainty to the elements under discussion beforehand, ambiguity and ignorance, such a table has limited utility. This applies to the determinations outlined in steps 2 and 3. This uncertainty assessment must be clearly articulated, perhaps overlayed if such a table is to be adopted.

3) Step 5: Deciding on “acceptable”. What is “acceptable” is perhaps a policy consideration, not a risk assessment one. We should be careful not to conflate the roles of risk managers/policymakers and risk assessors. Acceptability might be considered in the case where risk managers have conveyed a metric of “acceptability” to be included in any aspect of the RA, but is often not determined a priori (but could be). This iterates the value of the scoping phase of the RA and the need for including stakeholders in the outset, as discussed in discussion item 4.

4) DI6: Each step should be accounted for, but the level of applicability or need for information might be different in different cases.

5) DI7: Do you mean footnote 11, on attributes of receiving environments?

6) DI8: How about stating “Ecological and agricultural considerations; as in paragraph (d) above”.

7) DI10: See point 3 above.

8) DI12: Right, the question of benefits is not part of a risk assessment, which focuses on adverse effects and their potentialities. It does not deserve mention, it is a separate issue, so lets avoid the confusion.

9) Lastly, on Information documents, and indicate where in the Roadmap they should be assigned?

A broad guide to a risk assessment framework, that has chapters applicable to all steps, is contained in the 2008 publication “Science and Decisions: Advancing Risk Assessment” produced by the National Research Council in the USA in 2008.

This publication is available as record ID 48516 in the BCH library.

Chapter 4 or Uncertainty and variability is germane to steps 2-4.

Chapter 8 covers expanding the usefulness of the risk assessment and useful as an informational document supporting the scoping phase.

These two chapters are attached here.
posted on 2009-07-09 23:20 UTC by David Quist
RE: Comments on aspects of the Roadmap [#1292]
(edited)

There is much reference and discussion in this thread about precaution whether it be through an approach or as a principle.  This subject has been more than sufficiently evaluated by Protocol experts.  As such, I refer others to the article [Hill R, Johnston S, and Sendashonga C. 2004. Risk Assessment and Precaution in the Biosafety Protocol. RECIEL Review of European Community and International Law, vol. 13(3): 263-269.]  Oddly enough I couldn't find this publication authored by two (former) programme officers of the Secretariat in the BIRC.

Posted here is the conclusion of that paper, which provides this AHTEG with excellent guidance on handling this subject of precaution in light of the fact that our charge is risk assessment and not decision making.

"In summary, risk assessment and precaution as contained
in the Protocol are entirely compatible. Risk
assessment plays a key role in characterizing the
potential adverse effects of LMOs, while precaution is
an attitude in decision making that reflects a particular
aversion to risk in the face of uncertainty. Risk
assessment does not, a priori, condone or preclude a
precautionary attitude in decision making. Similarly,
whether decision-making attitudes are precautionary
or otherwise, risk assessment provides an important
input by characterizing potential adverse effects of
LMOs based on available information.

Importantly, future efforts to elucidate the application
of risk assessment and precaution to decision making
on imports of LMOs should not be overly prescriptive,
recognizing that decision making is, ultimately, based
not only on scientific information but also on value
judgements and other considerations that may vary
widely among countries and regions. Attempts rigidly
to standardize decision making in this area will inevitably
be resisted as attacks on a way of doing things
rather than a dispute about science. Sufficient flexibility
to allow differences to manifest themselves, while
at the same time insisting upon a certain rigour, is
inherent in the provisions of the Protocol.
(edited on 2009-07-10 19:47 UTC by Mr. Thomas Nickson, Consultant)
posted on 2009-07-10 19:43 UTC by Mr. Thomas Nickson, Consultant
RE: Comments on aspects of the Roadmap [#1294]
In regards to Stacked Events David offered "I like the idea of "cumulative and/or combinatorial" rather than synergistic as a descriptor"

We had insufficient discussion on the definition of cumulative and combinatorial effects.  In review of the Roadmap, these are mentioned in Step 4 (risk characterization).  This placement is odd to me as it seems to be an assessment of an effect, and would more rightly be in Step 1.  In its present state, it is inconsistent with the steps in the Roadmap and with the other points to consider.  If there are tests for combinatorial and cumulative effects we should discuss these and cite them.  I know that scientifically valid tests for synergism exist, and they would better be described in Step 1. 

If what is mean by cumulative and combinatorial effects is in fact uncertainty about unintended and unexpected effects, then it should be described within this context.

We need more discussion on this topic.
posted on 2009-07-10 21:53 UTC by Mr. Thomas Nickson, Consultant